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ABSTRACT 
 
Managerial Perceptions 
of Operational Flexibility. (May 2005) 
Yanzhen Wu, B.S., Zhejiang University of Technology, China 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. David N. Ford 
 
Large complex construction projects such as building an interstate highway, a dam, a 
chemical plant, an off-shore oil rig and a waste-to-energy plant often include 
unpredictable geological conditions, labor supplies, material deliveries, and weather that 
cause uncertainty. Effective and efficient acquisition and construction require the 
proactive management of these and other uncertainties to meet performance, schedule, 
and cost targets. Flexibility in the form of real options can be an effective tool for 
managing uncertainty and thereby adding value to construction projects. But flexibility 
can be expensive to obtain, maintain, and implement. Real options theory suggests a 
general approach and has developed precise valuation models. But these models of 
simplified real options (compared to managerial practice) have failed to significantly 
improve practice, partially because of a lack of knowledge of real options use by 
practicing managers. In contrast, the majority of managerial real options applications are 
identified, designed, valued, and implemented tacitly by construction managers. 
Understanding current practice and its similarities and differences with theory is critical 
for developing operational real options theories that can improve construction practice. 
Few descriptions of managerial real options practice exist as a basis for improvement.  
 
To address this need the current research has experiment subjects manage a simple but 
uncertain installation project with managerial flexibility. Subjects repeatedly value an 
option to avoid a slow and expensive system integration failure. Real options theory is 
used to explain their behaviors by customizing the model of uncertainty to reflect the 
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management context.  
 
To further analyze managerial real options practice, a system dynamics simulation model 
of the experimental installation project is developed. Policies for using flexibility to 
manage uncertainty that are applied by subjects are modeled and performances are 
simulated across a range of uncertain conditions to evaluate and compare policy 
effectiveness.  
 
All 21 subjects that participated in the research perceived flexibility as an effective tool 
in managing uncertain projects. But they are not aware of the factors that impact 
flexibility value. They correctly identified the relationship of some factors with 
flexibility value but not all of them and not the magnitude of impaction. Further research 
and development needs for expanding real options theory into the operational 
management of construction are discussed based on experiment and simulation results. 
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Large complex construction projects such as building an interstate highway, a dam, a 
chemical plant, an off-shore oil rig and a waste-to-energy plant often include 
unpredictable geological conditions, labor supplies, material deliveries, and weather 
that cause uncertainty.  
 
Uncertainty is classified as three types according to Reinschmidt (2004): aleatory, 
epistemic, and volitional uncertainty. Aleatory uncertainty is objective and is the 
variability in repeated experiments. Epistemic uncertainty is subjective and exists 
because of our limited knowledge about reality. However, volitional uncertainty is 
not objective or ‘out there’, “but is capable of being manipulated by the very people 
who use them (uncertainty).” (Reinschmidt, 2004). For example, weather uncertainty 
is aleatory uncertainty, which is out of people’s control. Geological condition is 
epistemic uncertainty, which exists because of our limited knowledge or lack of tools 
to know the reality beyond the surface of the ground. Uncertainty of the duration of 
activities such as design, procurement, and construction is volitional uncertainty, 
since managers modify their behavior based on their perception of the probabilities 
of different outcomes and thereby change those probabilities. For example, managers 
may hire more labors and have two shifts everyday instead of one shift if they 
perceive delay is likely.  
 
Uncertainties can result in quality declines, cost overruns, and delays. However, 
uncertainties may increase project value if proactive management is used (Ford et al.., 
2002; Ng and Bjornsson, 2003; Reinschmidt, 2004). For example, Ford et al. (2002) 
stated: “Delaying procurement, such as postponing equipment purchases, can add 
value to the purchaser if future prices are uncertain and happen to fall.” 
 
Uncertainty is expected to be bad in traditional project evaluation methods such as 
Net Present Value (NPV). NPV is a traditional project valuation method that uses the 
_________________ 
This thesis follows the style and format of the Construction Management and Economics. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
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discounted cash flow methodology. It is the difference between discounted net future 
cash flow expected from investment and the discounted initial investment. The 
discounted rate used in NPV is the firm’s cost of capital or the minimum attractive 
rate, which implies a higher risk-adjusted discount rate (risk-free rate plus a risk 
premium) (Yeo and Qiu, 2002). The discounted rate used in NPV reflects managers’ 
pessimistic attitudes to uncertainty and underestimates the upside value of 
uncertainty (Amram and Howe, 2002; Ng and Bjornsson, 2003; Yeo and Qiu, 2002). 
Not accounting the upside potential value of uncertainty after decision making is the 
biggest disadvantage of NPV, but it is widely used because it is easy to understand 
and calculate (Amram and Howe, 2002; Schmidt, 2003; Yeo and Qiu, 2002).  
 
Researchers and managers are increasingly recognizing the positive value of 
uncertainty (Amram and Howe, 2002, Yeo and qiu, 2002). Effective and efficient 
acquisition and construction require the proactive management of uncertainties to 
meet performance, schedule, and cost targets. Another traditional project evaluation 
method, Decision Tree Analysis (DTA), considers uncertainty by listing all the 
possible results if uncertainty and different strategies are involved. However, DTA 
can only present a limited number of scenarios and it is static without capturing the 
value of flexibility (Lander and Pinches, 1998; Schmidt, 2003). 
 
Real options theory makes up the disadvantages of NPV and DTA by capturing the 
value of flexibility. Real options is the extension of financial options to real assets 
(Amram and How, 2002; Ng and Bjornsson, 2003). An option is the right but not the 
obligation to take specific future action depending on future conditions, at some cost 
(Amram and How, 2002; Ford et al., 2002; Ng and Bjornsson, 2003). The cost of an 
option depends on six factors such as the uncertainty involved. This is explained in 
detail in the Literature Review section. For example, building an expandable 
waste-to-energy plant provides the opportunity to expand the plant in the future if 
industry waste dramatically increases. If the waste production remains stable or 
decreases, the cost of expansion can be avoided. The extra cost required to build an 
expandable plant, as opposed to a fixed capacity plant, is identified as the cost of the 
real option (flexibility). 
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Real options capture the value of managerial flexibility to address uncertainty in 
decision making (Amram and Kulatilaka, 1999; Ford et al., 2004; Yeo and Qiu, 2002). 
The value of managerial flexibility then can be used to calculate the total project 
value to help decision making. Real options could be growth options, deferral options 
or abandonment options (Ng and Bjornsson, 2003; Lander and Pinches, 1998). Real 
options theory does not suggest which the best strategy is, but it does provide space 
for managers to learn more about the project and to defer the decision to a later time 
when more information is collected and a final go or no-go decision can be made.  
 
Flexibility in the form of real options can be an effective tool for managing 
uncertainty and thereby add value to projects. But flexibility can be expensive to 
obtain, maintain, and implement (Ford and Sobek, 2005). Therefore, which options 
(if any) to develop and use is not obvious. Option design and the assessment of the 
value are critical for effective option use.  
 
Current construction managers focus on limiting project losses or mitigating risk in 
projects with high uncertainty (Ford et al., 2002; Reinschmidt, 2004). Risk avoidance, 
reduction, shifting, and transfer to mitigate risk are the general methods used in 
current construction practice (Ford et al., 2002). Real options theory is gaining 
interest among researchers and construction managers. Grenadier (1996) using the 
real options theory analyzed the influence of timing in real estate development 
(Grenadier, 1996). More areas and articles about real option application and models 
are provided in the Problem Description and Research Questions section. The 
potential of real option to improve construction management raises important 
questions: How can construction managers access real options and use it to 
manage uncertain projects? How can construction managers use real options 
theory to create optimal policies to meet performance, schedule and cost 
targets?  
4 
 
Real options theory suggests a general approach and has allowed the development of 
precise valuation models to capture the value of uncertainty and flexibility (Amram 
and Kulatilaka, 1999; Grenadier, 1996; Yeo and Qiu, 2002). However, real options 
theory is not as widely used as expected in the book Real options: a Practitioner’s 
Guide written by Tom Copeland and Vladimir Antikarov. According to a Brain & Co. 
survey in 2002, only 11.4 percent among 205 Fortune 1,000 CFOs (Chief Finance 
Officer) use real options, while Net Present Value (NPV) topped the list at 96 percent 
usage (Teach, 2003). Lack of knowledge about real options by practicing managers 
and the easy application of traditional valuation tools compared with the 
sophisticated mathematical formulas of real options are the reasons for the low 
application of real options theory (Schmidt, 2003; Lander and Pinches, 1998; Teach, 
2003).  
 
In contrast, the majority of managerial flexibility is identified, designed, valued, and 
implemented tacitly by managers (Ford et al., 2002; Ng and Bjornsson, 2003). 
“Discounted cash flow is going to look at an average scenario, but if you talk to any 
manager, that’s not how they think. They think about contingencies--- what’s going 
to happen, how would we react. And even if they don’t think that way, once it’s 
presented to them that way, they say, ‘Yeah, that’s the way we should be thinking.’” 
comments Triantis, University of Maryland (Quoted from CFO magazine, July 01, 
2003). 
 
Lander and Pinches (1998) summarized real options application areas. Natural 
resources industries, such as the oil industry, are the initial areas to apply the real 
options concept. Other areas include competition and corporate strategies, 
manufacturing, real estate, and other areas (Lander and Finches, 1998). Examples of 
successful real options practice can be found in Keith and Max (1997), which 
described how British Petroleum (BP) and PowerGen, two United Kingdom 
companies, maximize the uncertainty value by applying the real options theory and 
achieved great success (Keith and Max, 1997).  
2. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
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Lander and Pinches (1998) classified real options as options to defer, options to 
abandon, growth options and more. He also reviewed the theoretical work of how to 
model and value all these types of real options and related decision strategies. For 
example, McGrath and Macmillan (2000) use real options theory to evaluate 
investment opportunities in high technology projects (Ng and Bjornsson, 2003). 
However, all the models and theories are not widely used by managers. Three 
challenging issues that are pointed out by Lander help explain why these models are 
not widely accepted: 1) these types of models of real options are not widely known 
and understood by managers; 2) the assumptions required to build the models 
conflict with practical real options application; 3) the assumptions in the models limit 
the scope of application (Lander and Pinches 1998). 
 
According to Ford et al. 2002, “Construction managers are aware of potential 
benefits of uncertainty in projects. For example, experienced contractors with lump 
sum fixed project incomes understand that uncertainty in future prices may increase 
profits if prices fall or generate losses if prices rise.” However, Miller and Lessard 
(2000) drew the conclusion from 60 large engineering projects studied that managers 
intuitively manage uncertainty to gain the upside value (Miller and Lessard, 2000). 
There is no clear managerial practice and real options framework for analysis, 
comparison, improvement, and wide application (Ford et al., 2002; Miller and 
Lessard, 2000). Ford et al. (2002) pointed out that one reason for difficulty in using a 
structured approach to address uncertainty is “it is difficult to access the values of 
flexible strategies when relatively large uncertainties exist.”  
 
Miller and Lessard (2000) suggested building a real options framework in large 
engineering projects but provided no detailed description of how to develop it. Ford 
et al. (2002) demonstrated the potential benefits of using real options in construction 
industries and identified the challenges of implementation but no further solutions 
were recommended.  
 
In summary, there is a gap between current construction management practices and 
real options theory and models. Understanding similarities and differences between 
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these two is critical for developing operational real options theories that can improve 
construction management practice. However, few descriptions of managerial real 
options practice exist as a basis for improvement. To address this problem, this 
research develops a simple but uncertain project to investigate how people perceive 
and value flexibility in practice.  
 
This research focuses on the following research questions: 
- How do people perceive and value flexibility in uncertain projects? 
- What are the similarities and differences between people’s perceived value of 
flexibility and value assessed with real options theory? 
- How can the evaluation and use of real options by managers be improved? 
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Five hypotheses from two perspectives are developed to help address research 
problems. Hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 3 are developed based on a managerial 
practice perspective. Hypothesis 2, hypothesis 4, and hypothesis 5 are developed 
based on real options theory pricing formula about flexibility value factors.  
 
Real options theory is the extension of the financial option theory to real assets 
introduced by Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) professor Stewart C. 
Myer in 1977 (Teach, 2003). Real options pricing models use a similar principle as 
financial option pricing formula. Financial option pricing formula is often estimated 
by using the Black-Scholes equation, which values flexibility based on six factors: 
stock price(s), exercise price(x), risk free rate of return(r), time to expiration (t), 
variance of returns on stock (σ), and dividends (δ). Some research points out that 
the main difference between real options and financial options is that the former 
option is applied to real assets which are tangible (Yeo and Qiu, 2002). The six 
factors in financial option can find corresponding elements in real options theory, as 
shown in Table 1 (Yeo and Qiu, 2002). The relations to value of flexibility of each 
factor are shown in Table 1 column ‘Relation to Value of Flexibility’. Plus means 
positive correlated, minus means negative correlated. Three factors’ (Asset value (s), 
Expiration time and Uncertainty) relationships with value of flexibility are built into 
Hypothesis 5, hypothesis 4 and hypothesis 2 separately. 
 
3. HYPOTHESES 
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Table 1   Six Factors of Value of Flexibility Pricing Theory 
Variable 
Relation to 
Value of 
Flexibility 
Financial Options Real options 
s + Stock price Present value of expected cash flows (Asset value) 
x - Exercise price Present value of initial project investment  
r + Risk free rate of return 
t + Expiration time 
σ + Variance of returns on stock 
Uncertainty of expected cash 
flows 
δ - Dividends Value lost over duration of option 
Note: According to the Black-Scholes equation. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Project managers value flexibility as an effective tool for 
managing uncertain projects.  
According to majority literature about real options theory, real options theory is a 
good method to capture the value of flexibility. It is a good tool and should be built 
into strategic decisions. (Ford et al., 2002; Yeo and Qiu, 2002). Ford et al. (2002) said 
“…the explicit incorporation and valuation of options in construction project 
planning can help correct project undervaluation …” Yeo (2002) said “The real 
options approach in investment project evaluation appreciates the value of 
managerial flexibility and the potential of achieving improved returns on 
investment.” Identified above in the Problem Description section, real option is not 
as widely used as expected. Why? Hypothesis 1 will test project manager’s 
perception of flexibility. Do they think it is an effective tool for managing uncertain 
projects without considering the complex concept of real option and the mysterious 
equations? A more specific discussion of how this research tested this hypothesis is 
found in the Research Design section.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Project manager’s perceived value of flexibility is positively 
correlated with perceived uncertainty. 
Uncertainty is the main factor influencing the value of flexibility (Amram et al., 
1999). Amram stated: “When uncertainty is large, then it is more likely that the 
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project value will wander into the flexible strategy regions.” Increased uncertainty 
can increase the value of flexibility, which is also the main difference from traditional 
NPV analysis. In traditional NPV analysis, uncertainty reflects only risk and 
therefore has a negative impact. On the other side, as Ng and Bjornsson (2003) 
clarified “the value of an option lies in the asymmetry of the right to capture the 
upside without the obligation to bear the downside.” For example, “a contractor who 
has the option to expand the highway from two lanes to four will not do so unless the 
increased revenue from tolls more than covers the construction costs.” from Ng and 
Bjornsson (2003). Therefore, more uncertainty, which means a larger variance, will 
increase the value of flexibility (Yeo and Qiu, 2002). This research focuses on the 
relationship between uncertainty and the value of flexibility as perceived by 
managers.  
 
Hypothesis 2 tests if the perceived relationship in construction manager’s minds is 
consistent with the real options theory. Support for Hypothesis 2 can be indicated by 
a positive slope of an uncertainty versus perceived value of flexibility graph. A more 
specific discussion of how uncertainty was considered in this research and its 
relationship with perceived value of flexibility is found in the Research Design 
section.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Differences in levels of risk-aversion impact the perceived value of 
flexibility.  
Real options theory states that the value of flexibility is driven by six factors as 
described in the Literature Review section. Ng and Bjornsson (2003) mentioned the 
weak point in real options theory that “it ignores the decision maker’s risk 
preference.” Hypothesis 3 is designed to test if levels of risk-aversion impact 
construction managers’ perceived value of flexibility. In our research, risk is defined 
as the degree of probability of certain loss or gain (Merriam Webster Dictionary). 
Risk-averse people try to avoid uncertainty or take the uncertainty when adequately 
compensated. Risk-seeking people prefer greater uncertainty than risk-aversion 
people. Support for Hypothesis 3 can be indicated by differences in perceived values 
of flexibility between managers who are risk-seeking and risk-averse.  
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Hypothesis 4: Value of flexibility in project manager’s perception is positively 
correlated with flexibility expiration time.  
According to real options pricing theory, the value of flexibility increases if 
flexibility expiration time increases. Flexibility expiration time is the time from real 
options gained (purchased) to real options implemented. Hypothesis 4 is to evaluate 
whether manager’s perception of this relationship is consistent with real option 
theory. Support for Hypothesis 4 can be indicated by a positive slope of flexibility 
expiration time versus perceived value of flexibility graph. A more specific 
description of this relationship that is tested in this research can be found in the 
Research Design section.  
 
Hypothesis 5: Value of flexibility in project manager’s perception is positively 
correlated with initial project investment (asset value).  
According to real options pricing theory, the value of flexibility increases if initial 
project investment increases. Hypothesis 5 is to evaluate whether manager’s 
perception of this relationship is consistent with Real option theory. Support for 
Hypothesis 5 can be indicated by a positive slope of initial project investment versus 
perceived value of flexibility graph. A more specific description of this relationship 
that is tested in this research can be found in the Research Design section.  
 
The research captures managers’ perceptions from this five hypotheses testing. 
Managerial practice of flexibility is tested from hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 3. 
Managers’ perceived relationship of factors with value of flexibility is tested from 
hypothesis 2, hypothesis 4, and hypothesis 5. Due to unavailability of project 
managers as subjects all hypotheses are operationalized using the perceptions of 
subjects who participated in this experiment. There are more descriptions of subjects 
surrogated project managers in the Research Design Section.  
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4.1. Research Method 
To test the hypotheses and address the research questions a simulated simple 
uncertain installation project is developed. Research subjects were required to 
manage this uncertain project without and then with managerial flexibility. Subjects 
repeatedly value an option to avoid a slow and expensive system integration failure. 
Subjects were asked questions after managing the project. Questions are about how 
they made decisions during the game without and with flexibility, about how they 
valued flexibility and other questions related to their perception of flexibility. 
Performances and self-descriptions were analyzed to find out how subjects perceived 
and valued flexibility in an uncertain project. Policies were classified and their 
corresponding performances were compared. Hypotheses were tested based on data 
collected from the experiment and subjects’ answers to the interview questions.  
 
A system dynamics simulation model of the experimental project was developed to 
further analyze managerial flexibility practice. Simulations handled a range of 
uncertain conditions. The policies for using with and without flexibility to manage 
uncertainty that are used by participants were built into the model. Results of the 
simulations were used to evaluate policy effectiveness. Hypotheses tests and 
simulation results comparison were used to suggest developing and expanding 
operational real options theory and construction managers’ practice in uncertain 
projects. 
 
4.2. Research Design 
4.2.1. Rig Installation Game (Experiment) 
A simplified Rig Installation Game was used to create a simple project with 
uncertainty. The Rig Installation Game represents on-site installation of a 
semi-submersed, deep water exploration and production rig for oil and gas in the 
Gulf of Mexico. A rig is composed of multiple systems such as the sea floor anchors, 
support cables, flotation can, topsides, drill rig, etc. The game simplifies the 
4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
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complexity of system structure and installation of the rig system into 16 systems. 
These 16 systems are laid out as shown in the right side of Figure 1 from 1 to 16. The 
only system interface constraint is that each system installed should share an edge 
with a previously installed system. For example, if system 5 is installed, then system 
1, 6, 9 could be installed. The 16 systems are built in different yards by different 
contractors.  
 
Rebuild
System
Successfully Install Untested System
Project Site
Systems
in Fabrication
System
in Transit
Receive System
at Dock System with
Problem
Fail to
Install
System
Tested System(s)
Test System 3
5 6 7
1 2
11
15
Redesigned
System
10
1413
9Rebuilt System(s)
4
8
12
16
Start System
Transport
Install Rebuilt
System(s)
Install 
Tested Systems(s)
System
at Dock
System
Redesign
 
Figure 1   Experiment Game Board of Rig Installation Game 
 
Each completed system leaves fabrication on different weeks, one system per week. 
In the experiment the unpredictable order of system arrival at the dock is the only 
uncertainty included. Dock and yards are expensive and scarce resources. This forces 
the manager to make a decision when each system leaves fabrication, before the 
manager knows if the system will meet the interface constraints or not. He must 
choose between reserving the yard to test the system or trying to install the system 
directly without testing. Each step in Figure 1 represented by an arrow takes one 
week. It takes two weeks to transport a system from fabrication to dock. Each week 
one system leaves fabrication. A decision is made when a system leaves fabrication 
and is exercised when a system leaves the dock. Each step between dock and site 
costs $10,000. If a manager decides to install the system without testing and the 
system meets the interface constraints then ‘Successfully Install Untested System’ is 
followed as shown by the middle path in Figure 1. To install a system successfully 
without testing only costs $10,000 (only one step taken). Alternately, if a manager 
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attempts to install a system without testing and it does not meet the interface 
constraints, then the system will fail to install and must be redesigned and rebuilt 
before installation as shown by the bottom path in Figure 1. This path costs $40,000 
to install the system (four steps involved). If a manager wants to test it before 
installation then it will cost $20,000 whether the system meets the interface 
constraints or not (two steps required). This path is shown in the top line in Figure 1. 
For a detailed game description and rules refer to Appendix A.  
 
Managerial flexibility is provided in the game in the following way. Managers may 
delay their decision about whether to test a system or send it directly to the site, 
which means they are not forced to make a decision when a system leaves fabrication. 
Instead they make their decision when a system leaves the dock and the number of 
the system is revealed, which means managers make their decision after they know if 
the system meets the interface constraints. Therefore, delaying a decision can allow a 
manager to avoid slow and expensive installation failure. If they choose to delay the 
decision then they are charged an extra amount of money to delay the decision, 
which is defined as the cost of flexibility. The managers continuously evaluate the 
cost of flexibility for each system and make their decision of either accepting or 
rejecting flexibility. Flexibility cost starts at $2,000 and increases $1,000 for the next 
system’s delay if managers accept delaying the current system decision and deceases 
$1,000 if managers reject the option to delay current system, with a minimum of $0. 
 
The system storage fee, the fee to ship a system from fabrication to the doc etc are 
neglected. Systems that are tested in the yard or being rebuilt can be installed once 
they meet the system interface constraints. 
 
4.2.2. Research Participants and Experiment Protocol 
Due to time and resource constraints 21 graduate students, mainly from the Civil 
Engineering Department of Texas A&M University, participated in the experiment. 
Lack of real world experience is the primary limitation of using students as 
surrogates. However, in this experiment, real world experience is not an important 
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factor for making decisions. Both students and project managers have the same level 
of knowledge necessary to play the Installation Game. Students and managers are 
expected to perform similarly on an information processing task such as the task in 
this experiment game (Ashton and Kraner, 1980; Khera and Benson 1970; Singh, 
1998). $10 for compensation was given to each participant and a monetary prize for 
the top six performances was rewarded to encourage each participant to perform his 
best. 
 
Each participant played one practice game without flexibility to get familiar with 
how the system works and how performance is measured. The game without 
flexibility is called the Rigid Game and the game with flexibility is called the 
Flexible Game. Then participants played two Rigid Games using their best strategies 
to achieve the lowest total installation cost. Performance was measured by the total 
cost; lower total cost indicates a better performance strategy. A sequence of 
pre-developed open questions regarding how participants made decisions was asked 
after the Rigid Games. These questions also included a self-assessment of levels of 
risk-aversion; more details are discussed in the Hypotheses Test section. For details 
of questionnaire refer to Appendix B.  
 
After playing the Rigid Game, the participants were instructed to play the game with 
managerial flexibility (Flexible Game). The concept of flexibility in the game and the 
cost of flexibility were explained before playing a minimum of three and a maximum 
of six Flexible Games. During the game, participants continued to make decisions for 
each system under dynamic uncertainty. The average total costs of the Flexible 
Games were used to evaluate the participant’s performance. Another sequence of 
pre-developed questions was asked of subjects after the Flexible Games. To assess 
how they made their decisions during the game an emphasis was placed on the 
difference between the Flexible Games and the Rigid Games. These questions also 
asked how they valued the flexibility, which factors they considered and their ideas 
of the relationship between the value of flexibility with uncertainty and other factors 
in Black-Scholes’ equation (details of Black Scholes’ equation factors refer to the 
Hypotheses section). The list of questions is attached in Appendix B. Experiment 
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protocol is attached in Appendix C. 
 
4.3. Simulation Model 
A system dynamics based simulation model was developed of the Rig Installation 
Game. Uncertainty (random sequence of system leaving fabrication) was randomly 
generated by the computer. Extreme strategies were built into the model to test the 
model behavior in extreme conditions. Quantified policies for using without or with 
flexibility to manage uncertainty used by the subjects were built into the model. 
Simulation results of a wide range of uncertainty described with probability density 
function (pdf) graphs were used to test and compare policy effectiveness. For details 
of Model refers to Simulation Results section.  
 
4.4. Data Analysis 
Aggregate participants’ performance, Rigid Game and Flexible Game separately, 
were statistically analyzed and described using mean, median, skewness, and 
variance. The average performance and one-sided t-tests between Rigid Game and 
Flexible Game and subject’s perception of the differences between these two were 
used to test Hypothesis 1 (subjects value flexibility as an effective tool for managing 
uncertain projects). Subjects’ perception of the differences between without and with 
flexibility games will be collected from the answers to the interview question: “If we 
ran many games will the average total cost with flexibility be [same, higher, lower] 
than without flexibility? Why?” Support for Hypothesis 1 can be indicated by the 
majority of subjects answering “lower”. Their reasons would be similar to this 
example: “I think flexibility provided me a chance to successfully install a system 
without testing and no failure. And the cost of flexibility is much lower than either 
testing or failing to install the system.” Support for Hypothesis 1 can also be 
indicated by experiment results of difference in mean performance between Rigid 
Game and Flexible Game.  
 
To test Hypothesis 2 (subjects’ perceived value of flexibility positively correlates 
with perceived uncertainty) graphs of cost of flexibility versus time (experiment 
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results) and uncertainty versus time (simulation results) were drawn. Then, both 
graphs are integrated to analyze cost of flexibility vs. uncertainty.  
 
There is a particular challenge in modeling perceived uncertainty in this experiment. 
A subject’s perception of uncertainty is related to the ability to predict the outcome of 
a decision of directly sending to site. The outcome of sending a system to test is fixed, 
that is it costs $20,000 to install a testing system. Two uncertainties are possible if 
system goes directly to the site, success (costs $10,000) or failure (costs $40,000). 
Relative certainty about either success or failure reduces perceived uncertainty. 
Therefore perceived uncertainty is low when either the probability of success (p(s)) is 
very high or the probability of failure (p(f)) is very high (same as p(s) very low) for 
direct installation of the next system. P(s) is very high at the end of the game when 
many systems have been installed. P(s) is very low at the beginning of the game 
when few systems have been installed. Only in the middle of the game, p(s) is not 
very low and not very high, then the predictability of the outcome is low, which 
means subjects perceived uncertainty as high. Therefore, the graph of uncertainty to 
subjects over time is an inversed “U”. Therefore Hypothesis 2 can be supported if the 
graph of perceived value of flexibility versus time has an inversed “U” shape.  
 
To test hypothesis 3 (differences in levels of risk-aversion impact the perceived value 
of flexibility), data were categorized according to a subject’s level of risk-aversion 
based upon his self-assessment, investigor’s observation, and actions during the 
experiment. An extreme risk-averse and risk-seeking manager’s policy and 
performance pdf graph were explained to subjects. Extreme risk-averse manager 
never sends a system directly to site when the system might fail to install in the Rigid 
Game, while extreme risk-seeking manager never tests a system in the Rigid Game. 
Performance pdf graphs of the extreme policies were generated from the simulation 
model.  
 
Subjects were asked to self-assess which of the following category they were: 
risk-averse, risk-neutral or risk-seeking. Then, the same level of risk-aversion 
subjects’ performance was analyzed aggregated to compare performance among 
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different levels in the Rigid and Flexible Game. In the Flexible Game, the average 
cost of flexibility of risk-averse people and risk-seeking people were calculated and 
compared to each other. Also interview questions about how they valued flexibility 
and how much they would like to pay during the Flexible Game were asked. The 
question posed to subjects is: “If you are the person who decides the Cost of 
Flexibility for each system, what will be the maximum you would like to pay? Why? 
Does it change during the game from the beginning to the end. [Constant, decrease, 
increase, other?] Why?” Support for Hypothesis 3 can be indicated by a difference in 
the graph of the average cost of flexibility between risk-averse subjects and 
risk-seeking subjects. It can also be indicated by the significant difference in the 
average maximum cost in the subject would like to pay from different levels of 
risk-aversion.  
 
To test Hypothesis 4 (the value of flexibility in subjects’ perception is positively 
correlated with flexibility expiration time), the following interview question was 
asked: “If you played the Flexible Game again exactly as we just did EXCEPT that it 
takes four weeks instead of two weeks to transport systems from Fabrication to Dock, 
would you delay your decision more often? Would net savings be [same, higher, 
lower]? How? Why?” Support for Hypothesis 4 can be indicated by the majority of 
subjects answering similar to “Yes, more delay is preferred and higher net savings is 
expected.” 
 
To test Hypothesis 5 (the value of flexibility in subjects’ perception is positively 
correlated with asset value), the following interview questions were asked: “If you 
played the Flexible Game again exactly as we just did EXCEPT that each operation 
cost $5,000 instead of $10,000, and the flexibility cost is half of what it was 
previously, would you delay your decision more often? Would net savings be [same, 
higher, lower]? How? Why?” Support for Hypothesis 5 can be indicated by the 
majority of subjects answering similar to “I would keep the same strategy since there 
is only a scale difference as before (both asset value and vale of flexibility decreased 
as half value as before)”. A further question was asked: “Suppose you are the project 
manager of a small construction company, will you use different flexibility policies 
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between a small project and a large project. Supposing the failure of the large project 
will lead to the bankruptcy of your company.” Support for Hypothesis 5 can be 
indicated by the majority of subjects answering similar to “I would a use different 
strategy, and would prefer more flexibility in large projects.” 
 
Finally, policies were quantified according to subjects’ levels of risk-aversion, 
answers to interview questions, experiment performances and investigator’s 
observations. Quantified policies were built into the simulation model. Simulation 
results were statistically analyzed to evaluate and compare policy effectiveness.  
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Results are presented in two sections. The first section presents experiment results. 
The second section presents simulation results. 
 
5.1. Experiment Results 
Experiment results are collected from 21 subjects. Participants spent an average of 
two hours on the experiment. In total, there are 42 Rigid Games with two Rigid 
Games for each participant and 83 Flexible Games total with each participant having 
played 3~6 Flexible Games. One game was deleted from the results because of a 
subject’s misunderstanding of flexibility. Results are separated into two groups: Rigid 
Game and Flexible Game. Subjects are categorized into three levels of risk-aversion: 
risk-averse, risk-neutral and risk-seeking. Statistical analyses were conducted 
comparing performance of Rigid Game and Flexible Game and comparing the 
behavior and performance of different levels of risk-aversion.  
 
5.1.1. Hypotheses Test and Exploratory of Experiment Results 
Hypotheses 1 Test: Subjects value flexibility as an effective tool for managing 
uncertain projects 
This hypothesis was tested with two sets of data: game performance and subject 
interview answers. Support for this hypothesis is demonstrated with game 
performance data if the mean Flexible Game performance is better than the mean 
Rigid Game performance. Aggregated subjects’ performance in the Rigid Game and 
the Flexible Game separately were analyzed statistically as shown in Table 2. F-test 
for significant statistical variance difference between the Rigid and Flexible Game 
performance was performed. There is no strong evidence to reject that they have 
similar variance at level 0.05 due to p=0.0984, and therefore the t-test (Two sample 
assuming equal variance) was used to test the hypothesis. One-sided t-test for 
statistically significant difference between the means of the Rigid and Flexible Game 
was performed. There is strong evidence that Flexible Game performance is better 
than Rigid Game performance at level 0.05 due to p=0.0006. Considering personal 
5. RESULTS 
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behavior diversity, performance comparison between Flexible Game and Rigid Game 
by person is compared by using paired T-test. Paired T test by person results p = 
0.00022 shows significant difference between the means of the Rigid Game and 
Flexible Game performances by person. Therefore, Hypothesis 1 is supported. For 
detailed performance of each game refer to Appendix D.  
 
Table 2   Experiment Performance of Rigid Game vs. Flexible Game 
Rigid Flexible
Mean Total Cost ($1,000) 270 247
Standard Deviation 39.97 33.76
Skewness 0.68 0.99
Count (n) 42 82
Variance Significant Difference (F-test)
Mean Significant Difference (t-test)
Paired T-test by person p=0.00022
p=0.0984
p=0.0006
 
Note: If p<0.05 in F-test, there is strong evidence to reject H0 of same variance at level 0.05, 
otherwise there is no strong evidence to reject H0 of same variance in F-test. 
If p<0.05 in t-test, there is strong evidence to reject H0 of same mean at level of 0.05, 
otherwise there is no strong evidence to reject H0 of same mean in one-sided t-tests. 
 
Subjects’ perceptions of flexibility as an effective tool in managing uncertain projects 
were collected from the answers to the interview question: “If we ran many games 
will the average total cost with flexibility be [same, higher, lower] as (than) without 
flexibility? Why?” All twenty one participants answered “lower”. For details of 
subjects’ answers refer to Appendix E.  
 
Subjects’ ideas are summarized as follows:  
1) Flexibility provided a chance to get more information for decision making, 
which decreased the probability of failure and increased the likelihood of 
successful system installation without testing  
2) The cost of flexibility was relatively lower compared to the cost of failure 
($40,000 to install the system) or the cost of testing a system ($20,000 to install 
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the system). The average cost of flexibility to delay a decision in 82 Flexible 
Games played by subjects was $1,850. For details of flexibility cost refer to 
Appendix F.  
 
Therefore, flexibility is perceived as an effective tool for managing uncertain projects 
by subjects. Hypothesis 1 is strongly supported by the experiment results.  
 
Hypothesis 2 Test: Subjects’ perceived value of flexibility positively correlates with 
perceived uncertainty 
This hypothesis was tested with three types of data: subjects’ decisions during games, 
subject interview data and simulation results. Subject decisions during the 
experiment were used to test this hypothesis by separately modeling and then 
comparing subjects’ perceived value of flexibility and subjects’ perceived uncertainty 
over the duration of a single game.  
 
Perceived value of flexibility was modeled with average costs paid/not paid by 
subjects for flexibility each week in 82 Flexible Games. The perceived minimum 
average $cof ceiling versus time line means subjects maximum perception of the 
flexibility value is no less than this line. Because this line is the average of the $cof 
when subjects delayed the decision (that is, $cof is the minimum ceiling that the 
subject would like to pay) and $0 when subjects did not delay the decision (that is, 
subjects definitely would delay the decision when $0. Therefore, $0 is the minimum 
ceiling he would like to pay.). The perceived maximum average $cof ceiling versus 
time line means subjects maximum perception of the flexibility is less than this line. 
Because this line is the average of $12,000 when subjects delayed the decision and 
$cof when subjects did not delay the decision. $11,000 is the maximum $cof subjects 
actually paid in 82 Flexible Games, therefore $12,000 is used as the maximum 
perception of the flexibility of subjects when subjects delayed the decision. Based on 
above analysis, subjects’ perception of flexibility value fell into the area between the 
minimum line and maximum line. An inversed ‘U’ of the average costs of flexibility 
area over time is observed from Figure 2. The X axis represents weeks during the 
installation game. The Y axis represents the average cost of flexibility paid by 
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subjects.  
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Figure 2   Experiment Cost of Flexibility vs. Time 
 
Subjects’ answers to interview questions about their policies in Flexible Games also 
support Hypothesis 2. Thirteen of 21 subjects stated that they would not pay in the 
beginning and end of the game when either p(successful) or p(fail) was very high. 
p(fail) is very high in the beginning of the game when only few systems were 
installed. They did not delay the decision unless it cost $0, because the system would 
most likely be tested anyway. At the end of the game, when most systems were 
installed, p(successful) was very high, they thought it was not worth paying extra 
money to delay the decision. They preferred paying more in the middle of the game 
when it was difficult to predict the outcome of attempting to install the system 
directly (i.e. when uncertainty was relatively high). Three out of 21 subjects stated 
they would like to pay more in the beginning of the game and the value of flexibility 
decreased over time. One of the subjects described the reason for his decision to 
decrease $COF over time as: “everything was unclear early in the game”. Three out 
of 21 subjects evaluated the flexibility value as constant over time during the game. 
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Therefore, the majority of subjects perceived the flexibility value as positively 
correlated with perceived uncertainty, which supports Hypothesis 2. Table 3 
summarized the answers. 
 
Table 3   Subject’s Perceived Maximum Value of Flexibility Over Time 
No. of Subjects Perceived $COF vs. Time 
13  
3  
3 
 
2 No Idea 
 
 
Subjects’ perceived uncertainty was modeled using the simulation model (see Model 
Structure section for details of model description) as follows. Experiment results 
indicate a subject’s perception of uncertainty is negatively correlated to the ability to 
predict the outcome of a decision of either testing or directly sending a system to site. 
Perceived uncertainty is low when either the probability of successful [p(s)] is very 
high or probability of fail [p(f)] is very high. Therefore, uncertainty can be modeled 
as:  
Uncertainty = min(p(s), p(f)) 
 
Uncertainty over time pdf graphs from 200 simulations is shown in Figure 3, as an 
inversed ‘U’. The system decisions during the simulation games are based on using 
an extreme risk-averse strategy in the Rigid Game: never sending a system to site 
Time 
$COF 
$COF 
Time 
Time 
$COF 
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when the system might fail to be successfully installed and there is no flexibility 
provided. Other decision policies can be used to test uncertainty over time in the 
game in future research. For details of model and equations of Uncertainty refer to 
Appendix J.2. 
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Figure 3   Simulated Uncertainty vs. Time 
 
The similarity in the slopes of Figure 2 and Figure 3 (both are inversed ‘U’) supports 
Hypothesis 2. A more direct way to compare Figure 2 and Figure 3 is shown in 
Figure 4. The peaks of two inversed ‘U’ do not appear at exactly the same time. 
Perceived average cost of flexibility’s peak for both minimum line and maximum 
lien are earlier than the simulated uncertainty peak. One reason may be that the 
simulation model does not exactly simulate the experiment condition. The other 
possible reason is that subjects potentially overestimate uncertainty in the beginning 
of the game because few systems installed on the project site and they potentially 
underestimate uncertainty at the end of the game when most systems installed on the 
project site. According to Bounded Rationality Theory, people are only partly rational, 
and are emotional/irrational in parts of their decisions making, because there are 
limits to formulating and processing knowledge to solve complex problems, 
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especially when continuous decisions need to be made (Simon, 1978). Future 
research could investigate this phenomenon.  
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Figure 4   Perceived Average Cost of Flexibility vs. Perceived Uncertainty 
 
Again could be drawn for each individual’s perception of cost of flexibility and 
uncertainty. But due to only 3~6 games played by one subject, there is no enough 
data to get significant statistical results, which is one of the experiment limitations. 
Future research can conduct experiments with more games played by one subject to 
allow analysis based on the subject instead of on games.  
 
Also at the end of the experiment, subjects were asked an interview question about a 
change in using flexibility if the system interface constraints changes: “If you played 
the Flexible Game again exactly as we just did EXCEPT systems that would share a 
corner with a previously installed system can be successfully installed as well as 
systems that would share a edge, would you delay your decision more often? Would 
net savings be [same, higher, lower]? How? Why?” Uncertainty decreases in the 
question assumption. 20 out of 21 subjects believed the value of flexibility would be 
worth less since uncertainty decreases. Hypothesis 2 is supported by the experiment 
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results. For details of answers refer to Appendix G.  
 
Therefore, a subject’s perceived average cost of flexibility is positively correlated 
with perceived uncertainty. Hypothesis 2 is supported by the experiment results. 
 
Hypothesis 3 Test: Differences in levels of Risk-aversion impact the perceived value 
of flexibility. 
Twenty one subjects were classified into three levels of risk-aversion: risk-averse, 
risk-neutral and risk-seeking based on their self-assessments, investigor’s 
observations, and their actions during the experiment. Subjects were asked to 
self-assess their level of risk-aversion after they played one practice Rigid Game and 
two Rigid Games with their best strategies. In the Rigid Game, risk-averse people are 
identified as subjects who rarely sent a system directly to site when the system might 
fail to meet the constraints. Risk-averse strategy is defined as an extreme risk-averse 
level strategy, because in this strategy, people never take a risk to send a system to 
site when it might fail to install. This definition was provided to subjects as an 
example of extreme risk-averse level manager’s strategy. Risk-neutral people are 
identified as subjects who sometimes send a system directly to site when the system 
might fail in the Rigid Game. “If there is a 50% chance of success (if system is 
installed directly), I would randomly decide to either send to site or to test the system 
(in the Rigid Game)” stated one subject whose self assessment was risk-neutral. 
Risk-seeking people are identified as subjects who often send a system directly to the 
site when the system might fail to meet the constraints in the Rigid Game. All-Guts 
strategy, sending all systems directly to site, is defined as an extreme risk-seeking 
level strategy. This definition was provided to subjects as an example of extreme 
risk-seeking level strategy. In total, the experiment included 11 risk-averse subjects, 
two risk-neutral subjects, and eight risk-seeking subjects as shown in Table 4. But 
none of the twenty one subjects was extremely risk-averse or risk-seeking individuals 
who never or always sent a system to the site when the system might fail to meet the 
constraints.  
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Table 4   Risk-aversion Assessment 
Particip
ant No.
Self-
Assessment
(Risk Averse?)
Investigator
's
Observation
Rigid Game
Performance
Flexible Game
Performance Notes
1 1 1 2 1
2 ? 3 4
3 ? 3 4 4 Subject's strategy is not stable. Sometimes he randomlymade decisions
4 1 1 2 2
5 2 2 3 if p(s)=50%, subject randomly decided 'to Site' or 'to Test'
6 ? 3 4 3
7 ? 3 4
8 1 1 2
9 ? 2 3
10 1 1 2 "if p(f)=2/8, then decision is 'to Site'; if p(f)= 2/7, then decisionis 'to Test'" stated by the subject
11 3 3 4
12 3 3 4
13 3 3 3 4 Between Neutral to Seeking in Rigid Game, moving toSeeking in Flexible game
14 3 3 4
15 1 1 2 subject's 1st Flexible Game is delete because of subject'smisunderstanding of cost of flexibility
16 1 1 2
17 1 1 3 1 Between Averse and Neutral; Neutral in Rigid game, movingto Averse in Flexible Game
18 1 1 2
19 1 1 2
20 1 1 2 Between Averse and Neutral
21 1 1 2  
Note: Self-Assessment and Investigator’s Observation Columns: ?-No self-assessment; 0: 
Can Not Tell; 1:risk-averse; 2:risk-neutral; 3:risk-seeking 
Rigid Game Performance and Flexible Game Performance Columns: how often 
subjects sent a system to site when it might fail to install? 1:Never; 2:Rarely; 
3:Sometimes; 4:Oftern; 5:Always 
 
In Rigid Games, risk-seeking subjects sent more systems directly to site than 
risk-averse subjects, since they prefer risk, as shown in Figure 5. Due to the fact that 
only two subjects are risk-neutral, the result has no significant statistical meaning. 
Risk-neutral is dropped out in later comparison of experiment results. The 
comparison between the risk-averse and the risk-seeking is good start for this 
preliminary research. Future research can collect more data and add risk-neutral level 
comparisons. 
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Figure 5   Percentage of Site Decision of Levels of Risk-averse in Rigid Game in 
the Experiment  
 
Graphing the cost of flexibility over time of levels of risk-aversion reveals that 
subjects may behave systematically different in the first and second half of a single 
game. Figure 6 shows the difference in the average minimum average cost of 
flexibility ceiling over time among different levels of risk-aversion. Maximum 
average cost of flexibility ceiling is not compared because the maximum ceiling 
when subjects did not delay decisions is hard to define for different levels based on 
current experiment data. Risk-seeking subjects had higher minimum average cost of 
flexibility ceiling in the beginning of the game than risk-averse subjects from 
analysis.  
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Figure 6   Average Minimum Cost of Flexibility Ceiling vs. Time of Different 
Levels of Risk-aversion in the Experiment  
 
Statistical F-tests and one-sided t-tests were performed for the first eight weeks and 
second eight weeks of the difference in average minimum cost of flexibility ceiling 
among levels of risk-aversion as shown in Table 5. P-values show there is a 
significant difference in the average minimum cost of flexibility ceiling difference 
between risk-averse and risk-seeking levels in the first eight weeks. Risk-seeking 
subjects have a higher average minimum cost of flexibility ceiling value than 
Risk-averse subjects. In the later eight weeks, there is no significant difference of the 
average minimum cost of flexibility ceiling value between risk-seeking and 
risk-averse. Hypothesis 3 is supported by the experiment results from the first half of 
the experiment. Future research could collect more data to further investigate this 
result.  
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Table 5   Comparison of Average Minimum Cost of Flexibility Ceiling vs. Time of 
Different Levels of Risk-aversion in the Experiment  
Strategy Risk-averse Risk-seeking Strategy Risk-averse Risk-seeking
Mean $cof 0.280 0.378 Mean $cof 0.463 0.354
Standard Deviation 0.047 0.054 Standard Deviation 0.211 0.178
p-value for F-test Averse Seeking p-value for F-test Averse Seeking
Averse --- Averse ---
Seeking 0.432 --- Seeking 0.471 ---
p-value for t-tests Averse Seeking p-value for t-tests Averse Seeking
Averse --- Averse ---
Seeking 0.013 --- Seeking 0.046 ---
Week 1-8 of Flexible Game Week 9-16 of Flexible Game
 
Unit: $1,000 for Mean $COF 
 
In the Flexible Game, risk-seeking subjects would like to delay decisions at the 
beginning to increase the probability of sending the system directly to site even 
though the probability of testing the system two weeks later was very high. Risk 
seekers focus on how to successfully install system. On the other side, risk-averse 
subjects prefer to test the system in the beginning of the game, because they did not 
want to pay the extra money to delay the decision, with the high probability of testing 
the system two weeks later. Risk-averse subjects focus on how to limit local costs.  
 
Hypotheses 4 and 5 testing introduction: Subjects were asked questions to determine 
if they perceived other factors influencing the value of flexibility besides uncertainty. 
The factors represent factors in Black-Scholes’ equation. Factors considered in this 
research include uncertainty, flexibility expiration time, and initial project investment 
(asset value).  
 
Hypothesis 4 Test: Value of flexibility in subject’s perception is positively correlated 
with flexibility expiration time.  
An interview question about a change in using flexibility if the time between the 
system leaving fabrication to arriving at the dock increases was asked: “If you played 
the Flexible Game again exactly as we just did EXCEPT that it takes four weeks 
instead of two weeks to transport systems from Fabrication to Dock, would you delay 
your decision more often? Would net savings be [same, higher, lower]? How? Why?” 
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Expiration time of flexibility increases from two weeks to four weeks in the question 
assumption. Real options theory would indicate the value of flexibility increases 
because uncertainty increases. Table 6 shows the interview results of changing in 
using of flexibility and net saving if duration from system leaving fabrication to dock 
increases in the experiment (Flexibility expiration time increases). For example, four 
subjects would decrease the number of delays and net savings would decrease if 
flexibility expiration time increases. A statistical one-sided sign test for the number of 
delays shows there is no strong evidence to reject the null-hypothesis due to r- = 6 
larger than r*α = 3 at level of α = 0.05 when n = 14. The null-hypothesis is that 
subjects’ perception of the number of delays is the same if flexibility expiration time 
increases. Statistical one-sided sign test for net savings shows there is no strong 
evidence to reject the null-hypothesis due to r- = 4 equal to r*α = 4 at level of α = 0.05 
when n = 17. The null-hypothesis is that subjects’ perception of net-savings is the 
same if flexibility expiration time increases. Therefore, Hypothesis 4 is not strongly 
supported by the experiment results. Subject’s perception of value of flexibility and 
flexibility expiration time is not positive correlated. For details of answers refer to 
Appendix H. 
 
Table 6   Change in Using of Flexibility and Net Savings if Duration from System 
Leaving Fabrication to Dock Increases in the Experiment 
  Net Savings Total 
 No. of Subjects 
Lower Same Higher No Idea  
Lower 3   1 4 
Same  3   3 
Higher 2  8 3 13 
No. of 
Delays 
No Idea 1    1 
Total  6 3 8 4 21 
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Hypothesis 5 Test: Value of flexibility in subject’s perception is positively correlated 
with asset value. 
The interview question about the change of use flexibility if unit costs are lower is: 
“If you played the Flexible Game again exactly as we just did EXCEPT that each 
operation cost $5,000 instead of $10,000, and the flexibility cost is half of what it 
was previously, would you delay your decision more often? Would net savings be 
[same, higher, lower]? How? Why?” Asset value and flexibility price are half the 
previous price in the question assumption. Real options theory would indicate that no 
changes would happen because there is only scale difference. Table 7 shows the 
interview results of changing use of flexibility and net savings if unit costs and 
exercise costs are both lower in the experiment. For example, only one subject would 
decrease the number of delays and net savings would decrease in these conditions. 
Statistical two-sided sign test for the number of delays shows there is no strong 
evidence to reject the null-hypothesis due to r- = 1 larger than r*α = 0 at level of α = 
0.05 when n = 3. The null-hypothesis is that subjects’ perception of the number of 
delays is the same if cost changes in scale. Statistical two-sided sign test for net 
savings shows there is no strong evidence to reject the null-hypothesis due to r- = 1 
equal to r*α = 0 at level of α = 0.05 when n = 5. The null-hypothesis is that subjects’ 
perception of net-savings is the same if cost changes in scale. Therefore, experiment 
results do not object Hypothesis 5. For details of answers refer to Appendix I. 
 
Table 7   Change in Using of Flexibility and Net Savings if Units Costs and 
Exercise Costs Are Both Lower in the Experiment  
  Net Savings Total 
 No. of Subjects 
Lower Same Higher No Idea  
Lower 1    1 
Same  16   16 
Higher   2 2 4 
No. of 
Delays 
No Idea     0 
Total  1 16 2 2 21 
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A further question was asked of some subjects after the previous question: “Suppose 
you are the project manager of a small construction company, will you use different 
flexibility policies between a small project and a huge project. The failure of the huge 
project would lead to the bankrupt of your company”. Real options theory would 
indicate the value of flexibility in small project is less than in huge project because 
small asset value. 10 out of 11 subjects answered they would prefer flexibility in the 
huge project, “Since we couldn’t afford a failure in a huge project,” as described by 
one subject. Hypothesis 5 is supported by the experiment results. 
 
Summary 
All hypotheses are designed to capture a subject’s perception of the value of 
flexibility. 
z Hypotheses 1 (Subjects value flexibility as an effective tool for managing 
uncertain projects) was supported by experiment results.  
z Hypothesis 2 (Subjects’ perceived value of flexibility positively correlates with 
perceived uncertainty) was supported by experiment results.  
z Hypothesis 3 (Differences in levels of risk-aversion impact the perceived value 
of flexibility) was supported by experiment results for the first half of the 
experiment. 
z Hypothesis 4 (Value of flexibility in subject’s perception is positively correlated 
with flexibility expiration time) was not strongly supported by experiment 
results. 
z Hypothesis 5 (Value of flexibility in subject’s perception is positively correlated 
with asset value) was supported by experiment results. 
 
5.1.2. Performance of Experiment 
Experiment performance of Rigid Game and Flexible Game and levels of 
risk-aversion are compared in this section.  
 
5.1.2.1. Performance of Rigid Game versus Flexible Game 
Rigid Game and Flexible Game performances from the experiment are summarized 
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in Table 8, as discussed in the Hypotheses Tests section. The Rigid Game and 
Flexible Game have a similar variance (p=0.0984). But the Flexible Game has a 
better average performance (lower average total cost) (p=0.0006).  
 
Table 8   Experiment Performance 
Rigid Flexible
Mean Total Cost ($1,000) 270 247
Standard Deviation 39.97 33.76
Skewness 0.68 0.99
Count (n) 42 82
Variance Significant Difference (F-test)
Mean Significant Difference (t-test)
p=0.0984
p=0.0006  
 
5.1.2.2. Experiment Performance of Different Levels of Risk-aversion 
The performance of each level of risk-aversion in the Rigid Game was compared, as 
shown in Table 9. F-test was performed to compare the variances. Because there are 
only four data for the risk-neutral level, comparisons with this level do not have 
significant statistical meaning. Risk-averse and risk-seeking levels have similar 
variance in the Rigid Game due to p=0.23 in F-tests. T-test for assuming equal 
variance was used and the result shows that there is no significant difference of 
average performance in the Rigid Game between risk-averse and risk-seeking 
subjects due to p=0.17 in one-sided t-test. 
 
Statistical F-test and one-sided t-tests were performed on Flexible Game performance 
among levels of risk-aversion as shown in Table 10. Risk-averse and risk-seeking 
levels have a significant difference in variance in the Flexible Game due to 
p=0.0000014 in F-tests. There is a significant difference in the average performance 
in the Flexible Game between the risk-averse and risk-seeking level due to p=0.0002 
in the one-sided t-tests assuming unequal variance. 
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Table 9   Experiment Average Performance of Levels of Risk-aversion in Rigid 
Game 
Strategy Risk-averse Risk-seeking
Mean Total Cost
($1,000) 263 275
Standard Deviation 35.35 41.79
Skewness 1.32 -0.03
Count (n) 22 16
p-value for F-test Averse Seeking
Averse ---
Seeking 0.23 ---
p-value for t-tests Averse Seeking
Averse ---
Seeking 0.17 ---  
 
 
Table 10   Experiment Average Performance of Levels of Risk-aversion in Flexible 
Game 
Strategy Risk-averse Risk-seeking
Mean Total Cost
($1,000) 234 260
Standard Deviation 17.31 39.37
Skewness 0.32 0.33
Count (n) 37 39
p-value for F-test Averse Seeking
Averse ---
Seeking 0.0000014 ---
p-value for t-tests Averse Seeking
Averse ---
Seeking 0.0002 ---  
 
However, subjects’ perception of the maximum value of flexibility collected by the 
interview question does not indicate that there is a difference in maximum flexibility 
value among levels of risk-aversion. For detailed values refer to Appendix E. 
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5.1.3. Quantified Policies 
Policies were quantified for the three levels of risk-aversion: risk-averse, risk-neutral 
and risk-seeking as classified in the Hypotheses Test section. Policies include Rigid 
Game policies and Flexible Game policies based on subjects’ answers and 
investigator’s observations to the interview questions after they played the Rigid 
Games and Flexible Games.  
Rigid Game policies of 21 subjects are summarized in Table 11. All subjects 
considered systems installed on site and the distribution of those systems. 14 of 21 
subjects considered systems leaving dock but have not been installed. 12 of 21 
intuitively calculate the probability of failure for the next system leaving fabrication. 
Subjects estimated p(f) considering systems installed on site and/or system leaving 
dock that the number of the system were revealed. Even though most subjects did not 
really do the math for each decision during the game, they considered p(f) more or 
less for making decisions.  
 
Risk-seeking subjects were willing to take more risk than risk-averse subjects from 
Table 11. Figure 5 in Hypothesis Test section also verifies that during Rigid Game, 
risk-seeking subjects sent higher percentage of systems to site than risk-averse 
subjects. In summary, in Rigid Game, subjects mainly considered the p(f) for the 
system leaving fabrication to make a decision. They sent a system to site when p(f) 
was under their acceptance risk range, and the main difference of different levels of 
risk-aversion is that they have different acceptance risk ranges. Risk-seeking 
subjects’ acceptance range is higher than risk-averse subjects’.  
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Table 11   Subject’s Rigid Game Policies Summary 
Partici
pant
No.
Level of
Risk-
Aversio
n
Sys. On
Site
Sys. On
Board P(fail)?
Cost of
Installa
tion
Path
Beginni
ng of
the
Game
End of
the
Game
Notes
1 1 X X X X
4 1 X X X 2
8 1 X X X site(first)-test(couple of sys.)-site/test(try risk, if the system failedthen I would test  more)-site
10 1 X X X site(first)-test-site(if p(f)<2/8)
15 1 X X X X 2 2 site-test(middle)-site(once got key card)
16 1 X X X 2 2 if p(fail)<50% decision was 'to Site'. I tried my best to avoid failure
17 1 X X X 1~2 2~3 if p(s)>60%, decision was 'to Site'; once started to send a systemto site, I would almost continue 'to Site'
18 1 X X X 1~2 2~3 if p(s)>50%, decision was 'to Site', consider increase p(s)to 60%or 70% for 'to Site' decisions
19 1 X X 2 2 site-test(middle)-site(when lots of cards on Test is scattered)-site(end)
20 1 X X 2 4~5 if p(f)<50%, took chance 'to Site', if failed then test couple more;last 5 cards always 'to Site'
21 1 X X X 1 3
Fail to install a system would delay the whole installation process.
'; less than 3 system might fail to install, decision would be  'to
Site'
5 2 X Test many systems would delay the whole installation process.site(first)-test(4~5)-site(if failed, test more system)
9 2 X X X Fail to install a system would delay the whole installation process.
2 3 X X if 2 system failed when I start sent systems to site then I wouldtest more system before sending system to site again
3 3 X X Fail to install a system would delay the whole installation process.If couple systems failed, then I will test more systems
6 3 X X X risk subject would like to take was high
7 3 X X site(first)-site/test(first sys. Center, then site, otherwise test)-site(start from middle)
11 3 X X X site(first)-test-site /test(if one system failed, I would test morebecause I couldn't afford more failure)-site
12 3 X 4 5 site(couple of them)-test(if couple of 'to Site' systems failed)-site
13 3 X X X X site/test in the middle, if fail couple of them, then go back to testconsidering the high cost of failure
14 3 X 4 5 Most time I took risk, if first card was in the center of site, then Iwould send more systems to Site
Considering Parts Sites?
 
Note: Considering Parts: lists the parts subjects considered when they made decisions in Rigid Game
Sys. On Site: Subjects considered number of systems installed on site and the distribution of installed systems of site
Sys. On Board: Subjects considered systems left dock, that is the number of the system is known but the systemhas not installed on site
p(fail): subjects stated that they calculate the probability of failure to help their decision
Cost of Installation Path: Subjects considered the difference in cost of three installation paths
Sites? : lists about how often subjects sent a system directly to Site when installation might fail
Beginning of the Game: the first eight weeks of the game
End of the Game: the later eight weeks of the game
Sites? Column: how often subjects sent a system to site when it might fail to install? 1: never; 2: rarely; 3: sometimes; 4: often; 5: always  
 
Flexible Game policies of 21 subjects are summarized in Table 12 with emphasizing 
on difference from Rigid Game policies. All subjects considered cost of flexibility 
when they made decisions in the Flexible Game even though they might consider it 
in different ways. Twelve of 21 subjects stated that they would definitely delay 
decision if cost of flexibility was $0. Ten of 21 subjects claimed that ‘if I did not 
delay first couple of systems, then the cost of flexibility would decrease to zero 
(according to the rules of cost of flexibility)’ or ‘the cost of flexibility increased after 
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I delayed couple of systems, then I thought it was no longer worth to delay the 
decision at that higher price.’ Nice of 21 subjects described that compared to the cost 
of installing a failed system ($40,000) or installing a tested system ($20,000), the 
cost of flexibility ($2,000 or $3,000) was cheaper. They said it was worth the extra 
expense to spend a relatively small amount of money to avoid spending more money 
to test systems. In summary, in the Flexible Game, subjects mainly considered the p(f) 
for the system leaving fabrication as they did in Rigid Game and the cost of 
flexibility to make a decision. They delayed a system decision when the uncertainty 
was high and the cost of flexibility was reasonable and they sent a system to site 
when p(s) was high or tested a system when p(f) was high. The main difference 
between different levels of risk-aversion is that they have different perceptions of 
value of flexibility under the same condition of uncertainty as discussed in the 
Hypotheses Test section. Based on subjects’ answers (Table 11 and Table 12) and 
investigator’s observations from both the Rigid Games and Flexible Games, 
following is concluded. Further research would verity this conclusion. The primary 
concern of risk-averse subjects was the certainty of success or failure of the next 
system sent to site. The cost of flexibility is of secondary importance to risk-averse 
subjects when making decisions. However, risk-seeking subjects regarded certainty 
as less important than risk-averse subjects. Risk-seeking subjects’ primary concern is 
the cost of flexibility.  
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Table 12   Flexible Game Policies Summary 
Partici
pant
No.
Level of
Risk-
Aversio
n
Sys. On
Site
Sys. On
Board P(fail)?
Cost of
Installa
tion
Path
$COF=
0
$COF
increas
e?
$COF
vs. $fail
or $test
Beginni
ng of
the
Game
End of
the
Game
Notes
1 1 X X X X X X
4 1 X X X X
8 1 X X X X X
never pay money to delay except when $COF=0. But I
paid $COF=1in the 3rd game, just taking  a chance to
increase p(s)
10 1 X X X X if p(s)>=75%, then decision would be 'to Site' no delay
15 1 X X X X X X 1 1
16 1 X X X X 2 2 if p(f)>0.25, then decision would be 'to Site' no delay
17 1 X X X X X X 1 3
18 1 X X X X X 1 3 if p(s)>=50% & $COF >=2, then decision would be 'toSite' no delay
19 1 X X X X 2 4
20 1 X X X 1 4~5
Last 5 sys. Always 'to Site'; try delay in the beginning,
once $COF went up and the sequence was not good, test
couple of systems
21 1 X X X X X X 1 2 No failure during game; in the middle of game I was morewilling to pay for delay
5 2 X X site(first)-delay 3 sys. test 1 sys.(delay cost high anddidn't help)-site(if fail test more)
9 2 X X X X
2 3 X X X if failed 2 then test more
3 3 X if fail couple of system, at that point delay was regardedas useful
6 3 X X X X X delay couple of sys. Then sent rest of them to site whenrisk is acceptance
7 3 X X X Few gamble in the middle of the game
11 3 X X X X X rotatedly decide 'to Test' or 'Delay' in the beginning since$COF lower
12 3 X X delay(if $COF<5 in the beginning), then Site
13 3 X X X X X X
14 3 X X
Sites?Considering Parts (Emphasis on Difference from Rigid Game)
 
Note: Considering Parts: lists the parts subjects considered when they made decisions in Rigid Game
Sys. On Site: Subjects considered number of systems installed on site and the distribution of site
Sys. On Board: Subjects considered systems leaving dock, the number is known but has not installed on site
p(fail): subjects stated that they calculate the probability of failure to help their decision
Cost of Installation Path: Subjects considered the difference cost of three installation paths
$COF=0: COF: Cost of Flexibility; Subjects claimed that they would definitely delay decision if $COF is zero
$COF increase? : Subjects concerned that cost of flexiblity would increase(decrease) based on delay decision
$COF vs. $fail or $test: Subjects compared cost of flexiblity with Cost of install failure system or Cost of install testing sytsem
Sites? Column: how often subjects sent a system to site when it might fail to install? 1: never; 2: rarely; 3: sometimes; 4: often; 5: always
Beginning of the Game: the first eight weeks of the game
End of the Game: the later eight weeks of the game  
 
These characterizing actions of subject’s in the Rigid Game and Flexible Game were 
used to differentiate policies of different levels of risk-aversion subjects as described 
in Model Use section.  
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5.2. Simulation Results 
5.2.1. Model Structure 
A system dynamics based simulation model of the Rig Installation Game was 
developed. The model consists of three main subsystems: Installation Subsystem, 
Strategy Subsystem and Cost Subsystem. Installation Subsystem includes the exact 
same game board as the one in the experiment, random sequence of systems arriving 
at the dock, system installation path, and system interface constraints. Strategy 
Subsystem represents the policies subjects used in either the Rigid Games or the 
Flexible Games. Decisions made in Strategy Subsystem decide the system 
installation path which is part of the Installation Subsystem. System installation paths 
decide the cost of each system (Cost Subsystem). For example, if the decision from 
Strategy Subsystem of the system leaving fabrication is ‘to Test’, the system 
installation path is testing the system in the Installation Subsystem. The cost for the 
system installation will be $20,000 according to the installation path. Cost Subsystem 
is the criteria to measure the efficiency and effectiveness of policy performance. 
Lower cost means better performance. The relationship between subsystems is shown 
in Figure 7.  
 
Installation
Subsystem
Strategy
Subsystem Cost Subsystem
Decision Cost
Performance
 
Figure 7   Simulation Model Subsystems 
 
5.2.1.1. Installation Subsystem 
The game board in the Installation Subsystem is shown as Figure 8 exactly the same 
as the experiment game board. An array was used to represent 16 systems in the 
model. ‘Sys. Leaving Fab. Sequence’ is decided in the Sequence of System Leaving 
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Fabrication part as discussed later. Time Steps decides the sequence of operation 
steps taken in each week as discussed later in the Operation Time Steps part. 
Decisions ‘Testing System at Dock?’ and ‘Delay System Decision leaving 
Fabrication?’ are decided in Strategy Subsystem (1 means Yes, 0 means No). 
‘Interface Constraints Met Flag’ is the variable that determines whether the system 
interface constraint of the system is met or not. An example of system 1 interface 
constraints is:  
IF THEN ELSE(Project Site[s2]=1:OR:Project Site[s5]=1:OR:VMAX(Project 
Site[Sys!]) =0,1,0) 
Which means if either systems 2 or system 5 is installed on the site or no system is 
installed on the site then system interface constraints are met (1), otherwise they are 
not met (0). 
 
The random Sequence of system leaving fabrication is generated randomly by the 
computer by changing ‘System Transport Order Seed’ as in Figure 9. ‘Start System 
Transportation’ is an operation step in Installation Subsystem as shown in Figure 8. 
The user can also input specific random sequences into the model as desired. This 
was used to test the simulation model for consistency with specific games as played 
by subjects in the experiment.  
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Figure 8   Installation Game Board 
Strategy Subsystem  
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Figure 9   Sequence of System Leaving Fabrication  
 
In the model, the system installation path is decided by a subject’s strategy and by the 
ability of the system to meet system interface constraints. Each week one system 
leaves fabrication and several steps are taken in sequence as discussed in Appendix A. 
In the model, ‘Whole Time Units’ =1 [week], and it was divided into 16 equal time 
lock steps as follows to enable each operation step in Installation Subsystem to act in 
sequence as shown in Figure 10.  
 
Operation steps taken each week:  
1. Install Tested and Install Rebuilt Systems 
2. Rebuild Systems 
3. Redesign Systems 
4. Ship system at dock to Yard or Site 
5. Receive System at Dock 
6. Start System Transport 
Specific Sequence  
Random Sequence  
Installation Subsystem 
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Time Flag 1 corresponds to the time for operation step 1 taken in each week: Install 
Tested and Rebuilt Systems, which is carried out as many cycles as possible, until all 
systems that meet the interface constraints have been installed. It uses first 11 time 
steps of each week because 10 time steps is the maximum time steps needed is 
specific sequence of system leaving fabrication happens. 
 
Time Flag 2 corresponds to time for operation step 2 taken in each week: Rebuild 
System, which is taken right after operation step 1. 
 
Time Flag 3 corresponds to time for operation step 3 taken in each week: Redesign 
System, which is taken right after operation step 2. 
 
Time Flag 4 corresponds to time for operation step 4 taken in each week: Report 
previous "to Test/Site" decision and Ship system at dock to Yard/Site, which is taken 
right after operation step 3. 
 
Time Flag 5 corresponds to time for operation step 5 taken in each week: Receive 
System at Dock, which is taken right after step 4. 
 
Time Flag 6 corresponds to time for operation step 6 (last step) taken in each week:  
Start System Transportation (last activity in each week), which is the operation step 
right after operation step 5. 
 
Time Flag 1
Time Flag 2
Time Flag 3
Time Flag 4
Time Flag 5
Time Flag 6
<Time>
<TIME STEP>
Whole Time
Units
Operation Time Steps
 
Figure 10   Operation Time Steps 
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5.2.1.2. Strategy Subsystem 
The Strategy Subsystem includes policies used in the Rigid Game and policies used 
in the Flexible Game. Rigid Game policies include some extreme policies and the 
Subjects’ Rigid Game Best policy. Policy in Rigid Game decides “Test System 
Leaving Fabrication?” which decides the Installation Subsystem. 
 
Extreme policies in the Rigid Game include: 
1) All-Guts Strategy: the subject sends all systems directly to site without 
testing and is an extremely Risk-seeking strategy 
2) All-Test Strategy: the subjects test all systems. 
3) Random Strategy: the subject decides either to test or send the system 
directly to site randomly.  
4) Risk-averse strategy: the subject tests all systems unless the system is 
guaranteed can be installed. In other words, systems never fail to be installed 
in risk-averse strategy. 
5) Subjects’ Rigid Game Best policy from experiment results in the Rigid 
Game was built into the model and discussed in the Model Use section. 
 
The Risk-averse Strategy was generated into the Risk-averse – X Strategy to allow 
the modeling a wide range of risk-aversion. Risk-averse – X Strategy means the 
subject tests all systems unless only X systems might fail to be installed. When X=0, 
it is the same as Risk-averse strategy. When X=13, the Risk-averse – X Strategy is 
the same as the All-Guts Strategy. Since the first system and the last two systems 
leaving fabrication can always be successfully installed according to the system 
interface constraints. That is, when X=13 all system will be sent to site without 
testing (All-Guts Strategy). 
 
Risk-averse – X strategy is shown in Figure 11. The first system and the last two 
systems leaving fabrication can always be successfully installed according to the 
system interface constraints. "Sys. on Board & Installable Sys." is the sum of systems 
on board and systems with constraints met but have not left the dock. “Time 
Constraints” means until the first system be installed, the judgment of guaranteed not 
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to fail installation is active because all systems' interface constraints are met before 
the first system is installed. But in reality, the second and third system leaving 
fabrication is not guaranteed to be successfully installed. 
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Installable Sys. +X
<Time>
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<Whole Time
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Risk-Averse-X Strategy
Sys. on Board &
Installable Sys.
Time
Constraint
<Time>
Sys. on Board
Sys. with Constraints
Met but not Shipped
<Tested
System(s)>
<System with
Problem>
<Redesigned
System>
<Rebuilt
System(s)>
<Project Site>
<Interface
Constraints Met
Flag>
Sys. Risk
Threshold (X)
System Symbol
 
Figure 11   Risk-averse – X Strategy 
 
All the extreme policies mentioned above are used to test the model and provide a 
performance base case, which is discussed in detail in the Model Validation section. 
The user can also input his decision for each system to test the model reproduction. 
Other extreme strategies such as Project Site Condition strategy used to test the 
model and performance analysis are also built into the model. For details of the 
model and equations of other Rigid Game Policies refer to Appendix J.1.  
 
Flexible Game policies include the four Rigid Game extreme strategies described 
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above and also include some extreme policies and Subjects’ Flexible Game Best 
policy. Flexible Game Switch is the variable used in the model to switch the game 
between Rigid Game and Flexible Game. Flexible Game is the combination of delay 
decisions with the Rigid Game part. The Rigid Game part is used to decide the 
decision of ‘to Site’ or ‘to Test’ if the decision is not Delayed. When the Flexible 
Game is played, both the delay decision part and the Rigid Game part are working 
together. When the Rigid Game is played, delay decision part is off. Cost of 
flexibility is also included in the Flexible Game Policy part. Extreme Flexible Game 
policies as shown in Figure 12 include:  
1) All systems with delay decision: all system decisions are delayed. 
2) All uncertainty systems with delay decision: all system decisions are 
delayed unless the system is guaranteed to be installed. 
3) Subject’s Flexible Game Best policy: policies from the experiment results 
were built into the model and discussed in detail in the Model Use section.  
 
Policy in Flexible Game decides “Delay System Decision Leaving Fabrication” 
which decides the Installation Subsystem. ‘Typical Rigid Game Strategy Flag’ is the 
strategy that the user can input his decision for each system to test the model 
reproduction.  
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Figure 12   Flexible Game Policy Switch 
 
5.2.1.3. Cost Subsystem 
Total cost includes the cumulative operation cost and the total cost of flexibility. 
Performance is measured by the total cost. The lowest total cost would indicate the 
best performance. Simulations handled a range of uncertain conditions by changing 
the System Transport Order Seed. A performance probability density function (pdf) 
graph was used to test the model and compare policies. This is discussed in details in 
the Model Validation and the Model Use and Results sections.  
 
There is no flexibility offered for the first system leaving fabrication because it is 
guaranteed to be installed directly. Cost of flexibility starts with ‘Initial Unit Flex. 
Cost’ =$2,000 and it will increase $1,000 for the next system leaving fabrication if 
the decision for the current system leaving fabrication is delayed otherwise it will 
decrease $1,000 with a minimum of $0. The cumulative cost of flexibility is ‘Total 
Cost of Flexibility’ in Figure 13. 
 
 
Installation  
Subsystem 
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Figure 13   Cost of Flexibility 
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Total Cost includes Operations Cost and Flexibility Cost. Operation Cost is the 
cumulative cost of each week, as shown in Figure 14. 
Cumulative
Operations
CostsWeekly
Operations Cost
<Test System>
<Install Tested System(s)>
<Install Untested System>
<Fail to Install System>
<Redesign System>
<Install Rebuilt System(s)>
Unit operations
cost per system
<Rebuild System>
Total Cost
<Total Cost of Flexibility>
 
 
 
Figure 14   Cost Subsystem 
 
5.2.2. Model Validation and Behavior 
Models can be tested by different ways as mentioned in Sterman (2000). To test the 
overall suitability of the model three tests are used: Structure Assessment Test, 
Extreme Condition Test and Behavior Reproduction Test were carried out in this 
research. Structure Assessment tests the consistency of the model with knowledge of 
the real system and each variable in the model has real meaning. Extreme Conditions 
tests model behavior in extreme conditions. Behavior Reproductions tests a model’s 
ability to reproduce the real system behavior (Sterman, 2000). 
 
5.2.2.1. Structure Assessment Test 
Because the model represents the Rig Installation Game, variables in the model 
should reflect the game played by subjects. All variables used in the model 
correspondent to variables in the experiment and real world meaning. For example, 
variables used to represent a subject’s decision should have real meaning in the 
reality that subjects considered when they made decisions. On the other side, all 
Installation  
Subsystem 
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variables in the experiment can be found in the simulation model.  
 
As described in the Model Structure section, the model has three subsystems. Each of 
the subsystem corresponds to part of the experiment, as shown in Table 13. Other 
variables in the bottom of the table are the variables that connect subsystems.  
 
5.2.2.2. Extreme Condition Test 
Extreme Conditions Tests include testing the total cost range of the Rigid Game and 
the Flexible Game with extreme policies. Extreme policies in the Rigid Game part 
were used to test Strategy Subsystem Rigid Game Policy part. Performance ranges of 
extreme rigid strategies were calculated based on the game rules. For example, in 
All-Guts Strategy, all systems were sent to site without testing. If all systems were 
successfully installed, which was possible when the sequence of systems arriving at 
the dock were each adjacent to a previously installed system on the project site, then 
the total cost could be $160,000. Each of the 16 systems only cost $10,000. But if the 
sequence of systems arriving at the dock was not adjacent to a previously installed 
system, then a maximum 13 systems would fail. Therefore, the highest cost of the 
All-Guts strategy would be $550,000, which includes three systems successfully 
installed at a cost of $10,000 each, 13 systems failed at a cost of $40,000 each. 
Similarly, the performance range of the All-Test Strategy is $320,000, Random 
Strategy is $160,000-$550,000 and Risk-averse Strategy is $230,000-$290,000. For 
details of calculations refer to Appendix K. 
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Table 13   Experiment Components Versus Model Variables 
Experiment Model Notes Details Refer to …
Game Board (three
installation paths)
Game Board Variables
(three installation
paths)
Example: System in Fabrication, System
in Transit
Figure 1 and Figure 8
Installation Game Board
Steps Taken Each
Week
Time Step 1,Time Step
2… Time Step 6
Each time step represents each operation
step in the experiment
Figure 10: Operation Time
Steps
Random Sequence
of System Arriving at
the Dock
Sys. Leaving Fab.
Sequence
squence could be either Random  as in
the experiment or Specific Sequence as
input by the user in the model
Figure 9: Sequence of System
Leaving Fabrication
System Interface
Constraints
Interface Constraints
Met Flag 1 means constraints met, 0 meants not
Figure 8: Installation Game
Board
Rigid
Game
Subject's Rigid Game
Policy
Extreme Policies(All-
Guts, All-Test, Risk-
Averse-X Strategy and
Subject's Best Rigid
Game Policy
Extreme Policies are used to test model
extreme conditions, Subject's Best Rigid
Game Policy reflects the results from
experiment
Figure 11 and Appendix J.1:
Rigid Game Policy
Flexible
Game
Subject's Flexible
Game Policy
Extreme Policies in
Flexible Game,
Extreme Policies are used to test model
extreme conditions, Subject's Best
Flexible Game Policy reflects the results
from experiment
Cost of Flexibility Cost of Flexibility Part
Same rules of cost of flexibility is applied
in the model as discribed in the
experiment
Total Cost Cumulative OperationsCosts All operations cost in the game
Total cost of flexibility
Decision Test system inFabrication?
The variable connects Strategy
Subsystem with Installation Subsystem
Costs Weekly OperationsCost
The variable counts all the operations
cost in each week. It connects Installation
Subsystem with Total Cost Subsystem
Total Cost
Subsystem
Figure 13: Cost of Flexibility
and Figure 14:Cost
Subsystem
Other Variables
Subsystem
Installation
Subsystem
Strategy
Subsystem
Figure 12: Flexible Game
Policy
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Sensitivity analysis of performance was performed by changing the random seed 
which generated a random sequence of systems arriving at the dock. Performance pdf 
graphs of 200 simulations for extreme rigid strategies (except 400 simulations of 
random strategy) are shown in Figure 15. Table 14 summarizes simulation results and 
expected performance by analysis. In random strategy, simulation results of 
performance ranges from $220,000 to $490,000 which is narrower than expected. 
The reason is the very low probability that the total cost will be $160,000, which 
requires all the decisions to be “to site” and the sequence of systems arriving at the 
dock adjacent on the project site. Similarly to get $550,000 results requires a very 
large number of simulations. The consistency of performance between simulations 
and expectation validated the Strategy Subsystem Rigid Game Policy part.  
 
Performance pdf for the All-Guts strategy and the Random strategy are skewed to the 
right which is consistent with the experiment design, because the cost of the three 
system installation paths is skewed to the right. It costs $40,000 for a system 
installation if the system failed to directly install, $20,000 to test the system and 
$10,000 for a successful installation.  
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Risk-Averse Strategy Cost pdf
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Figure 15   Simulation Performance of Extreme Rigid Policies 
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Table 14   Simulation Rigid Game Performance With Extreme Policy 
Strategy Mean Median Std.Dev.
Skewne
ss
Simulat
ed Min.
Simulated
Max.
Simulated
Range
Min. by
Analysis
Max. by
Analysis
Range by
Analysis
All-Guts 326 310 64.8 0.56 160 550 390 160 550 390
All-Tests 320 320 0.0 0.00 320 320 0 320 320 0
Random 323 320 43.4 0.34 220 490 250 160 550 390
Risk-Averse 268 270 12.0 -0.35 230 290 60 230 290 60  
Unit: $1,000  
 
A performance pdf of Risk-averse – X strategy in Rigid Game is shown in Figure 16. 
The average cost of installation reaches a minimum when X is three ($253,000) or 
four ($254,000). But variance increases as X increases. For details of total cost refer 
to Appendix L. The results indicate that extreme Risk-averse (X=0) strategy does not 
result in the best performance, but has lowest variance in performance. Taking a 
certain amount of risk in a Rigid Game such as X=3, X=4 can result in the best 
performance, with a medium variance. 
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Figure 16   Simulation Performance of Risk-averse – X Strategy 
 
5.2.2.3. Behavior Reproduction Test 
Because the model represents the installation game, the behavior of the model 
behavior should accurately reflect subjects’ performance. Real games data and 
extreme policies are used to test the model behavior reproduction.  
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Rigid Games played by subjects were used to test the model. A specific sequence of 
systems arriving at the dock and decisions for each system were input exactly as the 
real Rigid Games. The same system installation paths and performance as executed 
in the real experiment game validated the model.  
 
Flexible Games played by subjects were used to mainly test the Delay Decision part 
and Cost of Flexibility part. The specific sequence of systems arriving at the dock 
and decisions for each system were input exactly as they were made in the real game. 
The same system installation path, total cost for cumulative operation costs and total 
cost of flexibility validated the model.  
 
Through model tests as described above, the model was overall suitable for our 
research. The model is used for other research analysis as described in the Model Use 
and Results section.  
 
5.2.3. Model Use and Results 
Rigid Game and Flexible Game quantified policies as discussed in Quantified 
Policies section were built into the model to test and compare policies effectiveness.  
 
In the Rigid Game, subjects mainly considered the p(f) for the system leaving 
fabrication to make the decision and different levels of risk-aversion have different 
levels of risk acceptance range, as discussed in the Quantified Policies section. 
Therefore, in the model, Subjects’ Rigid Game Best Policy was modeled as:  
 If p(successful) > Site Decision Attractiveness Threshold 
 Then Decision for the next system leaving fabrication is ‘to Site’ 
 Else Decision for the next system leaving fabrication is ‘to Test’ 
Different Site Decision Attractiveness Threshold values were used for different levels 
of risk-aversion to simulate different policies of levels of risk-aversion as shown in 
Table 15. For details of model refer to Appendix J. 1.iii.  
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Table 15   Site Decision Attractiveness Threshold Value 
Risk-aversion Level Site Decision Attractiveness Threshold 
Risk-averse High [0.7~0.9] 
Risk-neutral Medium [0.4~0.6] 
Risk-seeking Low [0.1~0.3] 
 
 
Rigid Game average performances as threshold increases from 0.1 to 0.9 with 0.1 
increments are shown in Table 16 and Figure 17. Each mean performance is the 
average performance of 200 simulations (same variables setting the except sequence 
of systems leaving fabrication is different). Risk-neutral has the lowest average total 
cost (best performance) among levels of risk-aversion. Risk-seeking has highest 
average total cost (worst performance) and largest variance among levels of 
risk-aversion. Risk-averse has medium average total cost but has smallest variance 
among levels of risk-aversion. All F-test and one-sided t-tests results are statistically 
significant.   
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Table 16   Simulation Rigid Game Average Performance of Levels of 
Risk-aversion 
Strategy Risk-averse Risk-neutral Risk-seeking
Site Decision
Attractiveness
Threshold
0.7~0.9 0.4~0.6 0.1~0.3
Mean Performance 262 253 282
Standard Deviation 15.23 22.00 50.82
Skewness -0.33 0.20 0.81
p-value for F-test Risk-averse Risk-neutral Risk-seeking
Risk-averse ---
Risk-neutral 0 ---
Risk-seeking 0 1.81E-84 ---
p-value for t-tests Risk-averse Risk-neutral Risk-seeking
Risk-averse ---
Risk-neutral 8.07998E-14 ---
Risk-seeking 6.58E-21 1.13E-34 ---  
Unit: $1,000 for Mean Performance  
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Figure 17   Simulated Rigid Game Average Performance of Levels of 
Risk-aversion 
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In the Flexible Game, subjects mainly considered cost of flexibility and the p(f) of 
the systems leaving fabrication. Risk-averse level subjects’ primary concern is the 
certainty, while risk-seeking level subjects’ primary concern is the cost of flexibility. 
Therefore, in the model, Flexible Game policy was modeled as shown in Figure 18.  
 
Certainty
Impact of
Certainty
Max Cost of
Flexibility
Relative Cost of
Flexibility
Impact of Cost of
Flexibility
Decide
Attractiveness
Delay
Attractiveness
Delay Attractiveness
Threshold
Subject's  Flexible
Game Best Policy
Unit Flex Cost
Uncertainty
 
Figure 18   Subject’s Flexible Game Policy Simulation 
 
 If Delay Attractiveness> Delay Attractiveness Threshold 
 Then Decision for next system leaving fabrication is Delayed 
 Else Decide Now  
 
Equations:  
Delay Attractiveness = 1- Decide Attractiveness; 
Decide Attractiveness = [0, 1]; 
Decide Attractiveness = Certainty * Impact of Certainty + Relative Cost of Flex. 
* (Impact of Cost of Flexibility); 
Impact of Cost of Flexibility = 1 – Impact of Certainty; 
Impact of Certainty = [0,1]; 
Certainty = 1- Uncertainty; 
Certainty = [0, 1]; 
Relative Cost of Flex. = Unit Flex Cost / Max. Cost of Flex.  
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Exception: when Cost of Flexibility = $0, Delay Decision; 
when Certainty = 1, Decide Now.  
Different Impact of Certainty values were used to simulate Flexible Game policies 
for different levels of risk-aversion as shown in Table 17.  
 
Table 17   Impact of Certainty of Levels of Risk-aversion in Simulation Model 
Risk-aversion Level Impact of Certainty 
Risk-averse 0.7~0.9 
Risk-neutral 0.4~0.6 
Risk-seeking 0.1~0.3 
 
 
Results of simulation as the value of Impact of Certainty increases from 0.1 to 0.9 
with 0.1 increments are shown in Table 18 and Figure 19. Each average performance 
is the average performance of 200 simulations (same variable settings except the 
sequence of systems leaving fabrication is different). Risk-averse has the lowest 
average total cost (best performance), while risk-seeking has highest average total 
cost (worst performance) according to the simulation results. All results are 
statistically significant. 
 
Table 18   Simulation Flexible Game Average Performance of Levels of 
Risk-aversion 
Strategy Risk-averse Risk-neutral Risk-seeking
Impact of Certainty 0.7~0.9 0.4~0.6 0.1~0.3
Mean Performance 245 258 264
Standard Deviation 17.34 21.50 22.39
Skewness 0.25 0.04 -0.10
p-value for F-test Risk-averse Risk-neutral Risk-seeking
Risk-averse ---
Risk-neutral 8.63E-08 ---
Risk-seeking 2.65E-10 0.16 ---
p-value for t-tests Risk-averse Risk-neutral Risk-seeking
Risk-averse ---
Risk-neutral 6.69E-30 ---
Risk-seeking 1.92E-59 4.87E-08 ---  
  Unit: $1,000 for Mean Performance 
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Figure 19   Simulated Flexible Game Average Performance of Levels of 
Risk-aversion 
 
Simulation performance comparison between Rigid Game and Flexible Game is 
shown in Table 19 and Figure 20. Average performance on the Flexible Game is 
statistically better than the average performance on the Rigid Game regardless of 
risk-aversion levels. The simulation results of performance are consistent with 
experiment results as described in Hypothesis 1 Test. The simulated total cost of the 
Rigid Game and Flexible Game is the average of all simulated risk-averse, 
risk-neutral and risk-seeking in the Rigid Game and Flexible Game performance.  
 
Table 19   Simulation Performance between Rigid Game and Flexible Game 
Risk-seeking Risk-averse Total
Rigid Game 282 262 266
Flexible Game 265 245 256
Risk-seeking Risk-averse Total
p-value for F-test 0 7.44E-04 0
p-value for t-test 1.08E-14 4.55E-63 4.71E-24  
   Unit: $1,000 for Performance  
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Figure 20   Simulation Performance of Rigid Game vs. Flexible Game 
 
5.3. Performance Comparison 
Performance comparison provides insight of policy effectiveness. Average 
performances of different levels of risk-aversion in the Rigid Game and the Flexible 
Game, in the Experiment and the Simulation are shown in Table 20. Improvement 
from Rigid Game to Flexible Game is shown in Table 21. Table 22 shows the p-value 
of t-tests among different levels of risk-aversion. If p-value is less than 0.05, then the 
difference between the average performances is significant, otherwise the results is 
not significant. Therefore, the level of risk-aversion with best performance is 
summarized in Table 23.  
 
Table 20   Performance Summary 
Operational Cost Flexibility Cost Total Cost Operational Cost Flexibility Cost Total Cost
Rigid Game Risk-Averse --- --- 263 --- --- 262
Risk-Neutral --- --- --- --- --- 253
Risk-Seeking --- --- 275 --- --- 282
Flexible Game Risk-Averse 226.8 7.2 234 240.8 4.2 245
Risk-Neutral --- --- --- 238.8 19.2 258
Risk-Seeking 243.6 16.4 260 235.9 29.1 265
Experiment Results Simulation Results
 
Unit: $1,000 
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Table 21   Improvement from Rigid Game to Flexible Game 
Risk-Averse Risk-Neutral Risk-Seeking Total Risk-Averse Risk-Neutral Risk-Seeking Total
Rigid Game 263 --- 275 270 262 253 282 266
Flexible Game 234 --- 260 247 245 258 265 256
Improvement 11.0% --- 5.5% 8.5% 6.5% -2.0% 6.0% 3.8%
Experiment Results Simulation Results
 
Unit: $1,000 
 
Table 22   T-tests Among Performance 
Risk-Averse Risk-Neutral Risk-Seeking Risk-Averse Risk-Neutral Risk-Seeking
Rigid Game Risk-Averse --- --- ---
Risk-Neutral --- --- --- 8.08E-14 ---
Risk-Seeking 0.17 --- --- 6.58E-21 1.13E-34 ---
Flexible Game Risk-Averse --- --- ---
Risk-Neutral --- --- --- 6.69E-30 ---
Risk-Seeking 0.0002 --- --- 1.92E-59 4.87E-08 ---
Experiment Results Simulation Results
 
 
Table 23   Policy With Best Mean Performance 
 Experiment Results Simulation Results 
Rigid Game No Significant Difference Risk-neutral 
Flexible Game Risk-averse Risk-averse 
 
 
Simulation results of different levels of risk-aversion in Rigid Game and Flexible 
Game are shown in Figure 21.  
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Figure 21   Simulation Average Performance of Levels of Risk-Aversion  
 
From above tables and figures, following results concluded:  
1) Using flexibility in uncertain projects to improve project performance. 
2) Risk-neutral would perform best in uncertain project without flexibility. 
3) Risk-averse would perform best in uncertain project with low cost of 
flexibility.  
4) Uncertain project performance is more robust with flexibility than without 
flexibility, from the flat simulation performance in Figure 21.   
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Understanding how people perceive and value flexibility can provide ideas for 
improving operational Real option theory, which can help construction managers’ 
understanding and capture the maximum value of flexibility and can reduce the gap 
between Real option theory and construction managers’ practice.  
 
An experiment was used to capture managers’ perception of flexibility. Data from 42 
Rigid Games and 82 Flexible Games played by 21 subjects were collected and 
compared. A simulation model was used to test the effectiveness of policies used by 
subjects. Hypotheses based on Real option theory were tested. Results are laid out as 
follows. 
z Hypothesis 1 (Subjects value flexibility as an effective tool for managing 
uncertain projects) was supported by experiment results.  
z Hypothesis 2 (Subjects’ perceived value of flexibility positively correlates with 
perceived uncertainty) was supported by experiment results.  
z Hypothesis 3 (Differences in levels of risk-aversion impact the perceived value 
of flexibility) was supported by the experiment 
z Hypothesis 4 (Value of flexibility in subject’s perception is positively correlated 
with flexibility expiration time) was not supported by experiment results. 
z Hypothesis 5 (Value of flexibility in subject’s perception is positively correlated 
with asset value) was supported by experiment results. 
 
6.1. Contributions 
This research has objectively measured subjects’ perception of real options 
(flexibility) and tested subjects’ understanding of the relationship between value of 
flexibility and three factors in Real options theory. This research is the first research 
in real options area known to us to collect data from people in controlled experiments 
to describe behavior. This research found that subjects have a conceptual 
understanding of real options (flexibility) and the relationship of option value with 
uncertainty, which is not known to have been identified by previous research. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
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6.2. Real Options Theory Implications 
We conclude from this research that managers value real options (flexibility) as an 
effective tool in managing uncertain projects. Managers often are not aware of the six 
factors in the Black-Schole’s equation for valuing a financial option or how they 
impact on value of flexibility. However, managers correctly identified the positive 
relationships between value of flexibility and uncertainty and asset value. But, they 
did not have a clear understanding of how to estimate the maximum value of 
flexibility and how much each factor would affect the value. There is no support 
from the experiment that they clearly realize the relationship between value of 
flexibility and flexibility expiration time. Different levels of risk-aversion impacted 
the perceived value of flexibility, which is not considered in Real-Option theory.  
 
6.3. Limitations of Research 
However, in the experiment, only one uncertainty was considered in the RIG 
Installation Game: the random sequence of systems leaving fabrication. Real projects 
involve multiple uncertainties. Subjects made decisions in a short time and 
individually during the experiment. Calculators, software and other helping tools 
were not available to help subjects make a decision. According to Bounded 
Rationality Theory, people are only partly rational, and are emotional/irrational in 
parts of their decisions making, because there are limits to formulating and 
processing knowledge to solve complex problems, especially when continuous 
decisions need to be made (Simon, 1978). The current statistical analysis provided 
precious data to answer research questions although it might not be significant based 
only on data collected from 21 subjects. The lack of real world project experience 
among students was another limit of this experiment.  
 
6.4. Further Research Based on Current Research Results 
Based on current research results, the following future research and data analyses 
would be worth. More data collection from construction managers is desired. Due to 
a two hours experiment time, experiment computerization may be helpful for further 
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data collection. Once more data are collected, the following data analysis could be 
carried out:  
1) Risk-neutral level subjects’ performance and characteristics could be 
compared with other risk-aversion levels.  
2) Data could be compared based on the sequence of games to analyze 
whether subjects learn (make improvement) from playing. For example, 
all subjects’ first Flexible Games performances are aggregated and 
compared with all subjects’ second Flexible Games performances.  
3) Data could be analyzed and Hypotheses could be test based on subjects 
if more games were played by individual subject.  
4) Levels of risk-aversion subjects’ experiment Rigid Games performance 
and decision making characteristics would be analyzed. The results 
would be compared to construction management theory.  
5) Making necessary adjustments, even changes of policies used in Rigid 
Games and Flexible Games as summarized in the Quantified Policies 
section based on more collected data. These adjustments/changes could 
be used to improve the simulation model Strategy Subsystem.  
 
6.5. Future Research of Real Options 
Therefore, future research would not focus on convincing managers that real options 
(flexibility) is an effective tool in managing uncertain projects. Future research needs 
to focus on developing tools to help managers accurately measure the maximum 
value of flexibility. Future research needs to focus on improving manager’s 
awareness of the six factors that will impact value of flexibility and improving their 
understanding of the relationship of these six factors with the value of flexibility. 
Future research needs to focus on developing tools to help managers measure the six 
factors impaction on value of flexibility precisely. Future research would consider 
managers’ level of risk-aversion as an important factor in evaluating the value of 
flexibility. Future research can include the other three flexibility value impacting 
factors (risk free rate of return, present value of expected cash flow, value lost over 
duration of option) in experiments and interview a large amount of construction 
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managers instead of students. 
 
6.6. Managerial Implication 
Based on this research, construction managers gain beneficial from flexibility as tool 
in highly uncertain projects. Depending on ranges of flexibility used in projects, 
construction managers can perform differently based on the levels of risk-aversion 
they chose. If there is no flexibility used in the uncertain project, then risk-neutral or 
risk-averse strategy will perform better than using risk-seeking strategy. If there is 
flexibility used in the uncertain project, then risk-averse strategy will perform better 
than using risk-neutral or risk-seeking Strategy. 
 
Managerial real options are important to construction management. Improving 
understanding of managerial real options can improve project performance. 
Experiment of this research into the behavior of managers can contribute to this 
knowledge understanding.  
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APPENDIX A 
THE RIG INSTALLATION GAME1 
 
You are a construction manager on an Installation Team for a semi-submersed, deep 
water exploration and production rig for oil and gas in the Gulf of Mexico. The rig is 
composed of multiple systems such as the sea floor anchors, support cables, flotation 
can, topsides, drill rig, etc. The rig's size and complexity require that its systems be 
assembled and installed on-site. Individual systems are built in different yards by 
different contractors. To create a competitive advantage these systems are 
first-of-a-kind or include the latest technology. When each system is completed it 
starts the journey from its fabrication yard to a dock near Corpus Christi, Texas. The 
arrival of the systems at the dock is scheduled to occur in an optimal sequence and 
close to each other in time to meet the team's installation deadline. But the large 
uncertainties inherent in designing and building innovative systems make perfectly 
forecasting and controlling the completion sequence of the systems impossible. The 
actual arrival sequence at the dock often appears closer to being random than optimal. 
From the dock, each system is either moved into a yard near the dock or shipped 
directly to the site for installation. In the yard systems are tested for fit with other 
systems with templates and precision laser locating equipment. The Installation Team 
refers to these fitting requirements between rig systems as "system interface 
constraints." Any required changes identified in testing can be made relatively 
quickly at low cost in the yard. These changes assure successful installation on site 
when the system interface constraints are met. In contrast, if a system is shipped 
directly from the dock to the site it is tested for fit by trying to install it. Systems that 
meet the system interface constraints set by the previously installed systems are 
installed. But systems that are shipped directly to the site and fail to meet these 
constraints must be redesigned, then rebuilt on-site, and held until the constraints are 
met before they can be installed.  
 
Both the dock and the yard are expensive and scarce resources. Therefore the 
                                                        
1 . Developed by David Ford, January, 2004.   
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Installation Team managers must reserve the yard for a system when it leaves the 
fabrication yard and begins the trip to Corpus Christi and must move each system to 
the site or yard soon after it reaches the dock. This forces the team to decide whether 
to test each system in the yard or attempt to install it on-site when it leave the 
fabrication yard, before the team knows if the system will meet the system interface 
constraints or not.  
 
Each of the seven operations described above (test in yard, install tested systems, 
successfully install untested systems, fail installation, redesign, rebuild, install rebuilt 
systems), require an average of a week to complete and cost an average of $10,000 to 
perform. Therefore, the three possible ways to get a system installed are:  
  Operations 
Installation Path  Cost (x$1,000) 
1. Ship to site & successfully install an untested system ($10)  10 
2. Ship to site & fail installation ($10), redesign ($10),  
 rebuild ($10), install a system ($10)  40 
3. Test in yard ($10), install a tested system ($10)  20 
    
Given the uncertainties in the arrival sequence of systems at the dock, the installation 
success of systems shipped directly to the site, and the differences in costs and 
durations of the three installation paths, how should the Installation Team decide 
which systems to test and which to ship directly to the site in order to minimize total 
costs? How much will the installation cost?  
 
System Interface Constraints: System interface constraints are met when 
installation of the system will create a shared edge with a previously installed system.  
For Example: If system 5 is the first system installed, then system 1, 6 and 9 can be 
installed next. If system 13 is the first system installed, then only system 9 and 14 
can be installed next. 
 
Operation Notes 
1. Each system moves one position (box) toward the project site per week once it left 
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fabrication. However, more than one system can be installed on site per week as long 
as this system’s interface constraints are met. 
2. Shuffle the systems very well after each project. 
3. Systems must be installed as soon as they meet the interface constraints. The first 
system must go to the site and will be successfully installed.   
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The Installation Game  
 
Steps Taken Each Week 
Rigid Game 
 
No.  Action  Operations  
  Cost (x$1,000) 
1. Install Tested and Install Rebuilt Systems $10 per  
  system 
2. Rebuild Systems $10 
3. Redesign Systems $10 
4. Report previous “To Test”, “To Site” commitment of system at dock and…  
 then…Ship system at dock to Yard or Site:  
 IF ("Ship system to yard to Test") THEN (Ship to Yard and test) $10 
 IF ("Ship system to site") THEN(Attempt installation) 
      IF (Interface constraints met) THEN (Successfully Install System)$10 
      IF (Interface constraints not met) THEN (Fail Installation) $10 
5. Receive System at Dock free 
6. Subject Decision “To Test” or “To Site”  
Record decision  
7. Start System Transport free 
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The Installation Game 
 
Steps Taken Each Week 
Flexible Game 
 
No.  Action  Operations  
  Cost (x$1,000) 
8. Install Tested and Install Rebuilt Systems $10 per  
  system 
9. Rebuild Systems $10 
10. Redesign Systems $10 
11. Report previous “To Test”, “To Site”, or “Delayed Decision” commitment of 
system at dock and…  
If “Delayed Decision” SUBJECT CHOOSES “to Test” or “to Site” and record, 
then… 
Ship system at dock to Yard or Site:  
 IF ("Ship system to yard to Test") THEN (Ship to Yard and test) $10 
 IF ("Ship system to site") THEN(Attempt installation) 
      IF (Interface constraints met) THEN (Successfully Install System)$10 
      IF (Interface constraints not met) THEN (Fail Installation) $10 
12. Receive System at Dock free 
13. Refer to previous Delayed Decision choice and cost. Determine next Delayed 
Decision cost for system in fabrication. 
14. For system in Fabrication offer “to Test”, “To Site” (free) and “Delay Decision” 
(Cost from Step 6) SUBJECT CHOOSES and  
Record decision and cost offered.   
15. Start System Transport free 
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APPENDIX B 
 
MANAGERIAL PERCEPTIONS OF OPERATIONAL FLEXIBILITY 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
Describe the guidelines or rules which you actually used, not a policy which you 
believe would perform well or not a policy which you wish in hindsight that you had 
used. (Based on the performance (investigator’s observe) during games to adjust the 
questions) 
 
Decision Making in Games without Flexibility  
¾ How did you make Test/Site decisions during Games without 
Flexibility? 
i. Which parts of game did you consider when making decisions?  
ii. Order of importance (most-to-least) of those parts? 
iii. How did you use those parts to decide Test or Site?  
iv. About how often did you send a system directly to Site when 
installation might fail?  [Never, Rarely, Sometimes, Often, Always] 
---- Beginning of the game & End of game 
 
Decision Making in Flexible Games (Emphasis on Difference) 
¾ How did you decide whether Delay Decisions or decide to Test/Site when 
a system left fabrication? 
i. Which parts of game did you consider when making Delay/Decide-Now 
decisions? Differences from games without flexibility? 
ii. Order of importance (most-to-least) of those parts? Differences from 
games without flexibility? 
iii. How did you use those parts to decide? Differences from games without 
flexibility? 
iv. When you chose to Site/Test decisions for the system at Fabrication, 
about how often did you send a system directly to Site when installation 
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might fail? Differences from games without flexibility? [Never, Rarely, 
Sometimes, Often, Always] 
---- Beginning of game & End of game 
 
Perception of Net Savings of Delaying Test/Site Decisions in Flexible Games 
“Delaying decision makes sense if it reduces total cost, i.e. operations savings 
are larger than delaying Cost.” 
¾ How did you estimate the net savings of delaying the Test/Site decisions? 
i. If we ran many games will the average total cost with flexible be [same, 
higher, lower] than without flexibility? Why?  
ii. If you are the person who decides the Cost of Flexibility for each 
system, what will be the maximum you would like to pay? Why? Does 
it change during the game from the beginning to the end. [Constant, 
decrease, increase, other?] Why?  
 
Influence Factors on Net Savings 
¾ What other aspects do you think affect the amount of net savings? How? 
Why? 
i. If you played the Flexible Game again exactly as we just did EXCEPT 
that each operation cost $5,000 instead of $10,000, so does flexibility 
cost is half of Previous, would you delay your decision more often? 
Would net savings be [same, higher, lower]? How? Why? 
 
ii. If you played the Flexible Game again exactly as we just did EXCEPT 
that it takes four weeks instead of two weeks to transport systems from 
Fabrication to Dock, would you delay your decision more often? Would 
net savings be [same, higher, lower]? How? Why? 
 
iii. If you played the Flexible Game again exactly as we just did EXCEPT 
systems that would share a corner with a previously installed system can 
be successfully installed as well as systems that would share a edge, 
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would you delay your decision more often? Would net savings be [same, 
higher, lower]? How? Why? 
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APPENDIX C 
EXPERIMENT PROTOCOL 
1. Describe research area and interview purpose. Describe general agenda and 
reward for good performance.  
2. Consent Form 
Audio Tape Release Form 
3. Demographic Information Questionnaire 
4. Read Rig Installation Game Cover Story 
Alternative: Explain the game to the participant 
5. Play Rig Installation Games 
a) Rigid Games without flexibility 
i. Play one practice game.  
Rule: First 5 systems must be ‘To Site’, then participant plays the rest of 
systems. 
Show Results 
ii. Describe All-Guts Strategy, Random Strategy, All-Test Strategy, 
Risk-averse Strategy 
Provide performance data (simulation results) (Table C-1, Figure C-1) 
of these extreme strategies  
iii. Define Subject’s Rigid Game Best Strategy 
Two games with Subject’s Rigid Game Best Strategy 
iv. Interview about Subject’s Rigid Game Best Strategy 
 b) Flexible Games 
Note: Inform the subject that performance for reward is average of all following 
games.  
i. Describe Cost of Flexibility. 
ii. (Three ~ Six) games with Subject’s Flexible Game Best Strategy  
iii. Interview about Subject’s Flexible Game Best Strategy 
Define:  Net Saving = Operational Cost Savings – Cost of right to 
Delay Decision 
6. Conclusion and Closing 
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Table C-1   Simulation Performance with Extreme Rigid Game Policies 
Strategy Mean Median Std.Dev.
Skewne
ss
Simulat
ed Min.
Simulated
Max.
Simulated
Range
All-Guts 326 310 64.8 0.56 160 550 390
All-Tests 320 320 0.0 0.00 320 320 0
Random 323 320 43.4 0.34 220 490 250
Risk-Averse 268 270 12.0 -0.35 230 290 60  
Unit: $1,000 
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Figure C-1   Simulation Performance with Extreme Rigid Game Policies 
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APPENDIX D 
EXPERIMENT PERFORMANCE 
Table D-1   Experiment Performance of 21 Subjects 
Participant
No.
Practice
Rigid Rigid1 Rigid2
Avg. of
Rigid
Flexible
1
Flexible
2
Flexible
3
Flexible
4
Flexible
5
Flexible
6
Avg. of
Flex.
1 280 260 250 255 242 246 232 240
2 430 300 270 285 239 308 285 236 246 263
3 300 230 320 275 240 314 322 228 227 280 269
4 310 320 280 300 213 220 203 257 223
5 340 310 240 275 252 331 223 269
6 380 230 240 235 243 284 217 248
7 250 320 310 315 260 260 271 242 258
8 300 250 240 245 241 220 230 230
9 270 360 240 300 203 248 247 233
10 300 240 260 250 244 235 238 239
11 320 320 280 300 220 227 226 241 229
12 320 220 340 280 179 287 354 304 321 203 275
13 260 220 300 260 305 309 231 231 233 201 252
14 260 270 230 250 245 270 265 270 304 271
15 360 260 240 250 216 225 216 235 233 225
16 380 240 300 270 240 241 223 235
17 290 270 210 240 227 209 260 232
18 280 240 230 235 201 211 234 215
19 230 340 250 295 248 221 251 240
20 340 350 260 305 249 263 280 264
21 280 240 250 245 221 240 230 245 234
310 278 264 270 236 255 250 247 261 229 247
Performance
 
Unit: $1,000 
Note: Practice Rigid Column: lists the performance of each participant during the first 
practice Rigid Game 
Participant played one practice Rigid Game, two Rigid Games, and 3~6 Flexible 
Games  
Participant No.15’s first Flexible Game results is deleted due to subject’s 
misunderstanding of Flexibility 
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Figure D-1   Experiment Performance pdf of Rigid Game vs. Flexible Game 
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APPENDIX E 
SUBJECT’S PERCEPTION OF PERFORMANCE 
BETWEEN RIGID GAME AND FLEXIBLE GAME 
Interview Questions:  
1) If we ran many games will the average total cost with flexible be [same, 
higher, lower] than without flexibility? Why?  
 2) If you are the person who decides the Cost of Flexibility for each system, 
what will be the maximum you would like to pay? Why? Does is change during the 
game from beginning to the end. [Constant, decrease, increase, other?] Why? 
Answers:  
Table E-1   Interview Answers A 
Participa
nt No.
Avg.
Flexible vs.
Avg. Rigid
Max $COF
participant
willing to pay
($1,000)
Reason for Avg. total cost with flexible lower than rigid game
1 Lower 5 No detailed discription
2 Lower 6 No detailed discription
3 Lower ? Delay decision allow sufficient time to make decision
4 Lower 5 Cost of delay is less than cost to test: I only delay when p(s)>>p(f)), which I testit in rigid game; [when p(s)< p(f), test anyway, no delay]
5 Lower 3 $0 to delay, which give definite picture, max$COF=2, love $0
6 Lower ? Flex. reduce likelihood of failure in long run
7 Lower 1 $0 delay, reduce overall risk
8 Lower 10 Delay decision allow get more information to make decision
9 Lower 3 More risk in rigid game, $fail is high; Delay prevented fail and $cof is relativelylow
10 Lower 3 Delay to avoied fail, which cost relatively less then failure
11 Lower 5 $cof is much less than $fail
12 Lower 5 Delay avoid failure with relatively lower cost compare to $fail
13 Lower 5 $cof is much less then $test
14 Lower 6 Delay provide opportunity to get more infomaiton and know exactly whatdecision to make
15 Lower 5 $cof is relatively cheap than $test, or $fail
16 Lower 5 $0 to delay increase chance to go to site directly, reduce overall cost
17 Lower 20 $cof is much lower than $fail, 1*$fail=2*$test, then choose many times delay toavoid failure
18 Lower 4 $cof is low, middle of the game would like to pay $1,$2 to delay. $(test-site)*50%=$5
19 Lower 2 Delay decision allow getting more information to make decision
20 Lower 2 Delay avoid failure with relatively lower cost compare to $fail
21 Lower 9 Always avoid failure without having to Test, sometimes to Site with delay. $cof isrelatively low cost compare to $test.  
Unit: $1,000 for Max $COF  
Notes: Max $COF participant willing to pay column: '?' means subject have difficulty 
answering the question. 
$COF: Cost of Flexibility; $fail: Cost of failure which is $40,000 totally for installation 
the system; $test: Cost of Test system which is $20,000 totally for installation the system.
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APPENDIX F 
COST OF FLEXIBILITY IN EXPERIMENT 
Table F-1   Flexibility Cost in Each Experiment Game 
Total
Cost of
Flex
No.
times
Purchas
ed Flex
Total
Cost of
Flex
No.
times
Purchas
ed Flex
Total
Cost of
Flex
No.
times
Purchas
ed Flex
Total
Cost of
Flex
No.
times
Purchas
ed Flex
Total
Cost of
Flex
No.
times
Purchas
ed Flex
Total
Cost of
Flex
No.
times
Purchas
ed Flex
1 12 4 6 4 2 2 2.00
2 19 4 28 6 5 4 16 4 16 4 3.82
3 0 0 4 3 72 8 28 4 7 3 0 0 6.17
4 3 5 0 4 3 5 7 7 0.62
5 2 5 1 5 3 6 0.38
6 3 4 44 8 7 4 3.38
7 0 6 0 5 1 6 2 6 0.13
8 1 6 0 5 0 4 0.07
9 3 4 8 6 17 7 1.65
10 14 7 5 6 8 6 1.42
11 10 5 7 5 6 6 1 6 1.09
12 9 5 17 6 24 6 44 8 21 6 13 5 3.56
13 35 8 9 6 11 5 11 6 13 6 11 5 2.50
14 15 6 20 5 35 7 20 5 54 9 4.50
15 6 7 15 7 6 5 15 7 3 5 1.45
16 0 5 1 5 3 5 0.27
17 7 6 9 5 10 6 1.53
18 1 4 1 4 4 5 0.46
19 8 5 1 5 1 6 0.63
20 9 6 3 5 10 8 1.16
21 1 4 10 6 20 7 15 6 2.00
Average($) 1.85
Participant
No.
Flexible1 Flexible2 Flexible3 Flexible4 Flexible5 Flexible6
Avg
Cost of
Flex
 
Note: Unit: $1,000 
‘Total Cost of Flex’ represents the total cost paid to delay decision in one game. 
‘No. Times Purchased Flex’ represents number of times flexibility was purchased in 
one game 
‘Avg Cost of Flex’ means the average cost for each delay decision.  
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A cost of flexibility versus performance graph from 82 Flexible Games does not 
indicate an optimum range of cost of flexibility to get best performance, as shown in 
Figure F-1.  
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Figure F-1   Total Cost of Flexibility in Each Game vs. Performance 
 
Number of delays versus performance graph also does not indicate an optimum 
number of delays to get best performance, as shown in Figure F-2. 
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Figure F-2   No. of Delays in Each Flex. Game vs. Performance 
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APPENDIX G 
SUBJECT’S PERCEPTION OF THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN THE VALUE OF FLEXIBILITY AND UNCERTAINTY 
Interview Questions: 
1) If you played the Flexible Game again exactly as we just did EXCEPT 
systems that would share a corner with a previously installed system can be 
successfully installed as well as systems that would share a edge, would you delay 
your decision more often? Would net savings be [same, higher, lower]? How? Why? 
 
Table G-1   Interview Answers B 
Particip
ant No.
Level of Risk-
Aversion
Change in using of
flex if system
interface constraints
changes
Change in savings
due to flex if
constraints changes
1 1 -1 -1
2 3 -1 -1
3 3 -1 -1
4 1 -1 -1
5 2 -1 -1
6 3 -1 -1
7 3 -1 2
8 1 -1 1
9 2 -1 -1
10 1 -1 2
11 3 -1 2
12 3 -1 -1
13 3 -1 -1
14 3 -1 2
15 1 -1 2
16 1 -1 -1
17 1 -1 -1
18 1 -1 -1
19 1 -1 -1
20 1 1 1
21 1 -1 -1
Answers
I
 
Notes: Answers: 1:More Delay(Net Saving); 0:Same Strategy(Net Saving); -1:Less 
Delay(Net Saving); 2: no idea 
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APPENDIX H 
SUBJECT’S PERCEPTION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE 
VALUE OF FLEXIBILITY AND FLEXIBILITY EXPIRATION TIME 
Interview Questions: 
1) If you played the Flexible Game again exactly as we just did EXCEPT that it 
takes four weeks instead of two weeks to transport systems from Fabrication to Dock, 
would you delay your decision more often? Would net savings be [same, higher, 
lower]? How? Why? 
 
Table H-1   Interview Answers C 
 
Particip
ant No.
Level of Risk-
Aversion
Change in using of flex
if duration from system
leaving the fabrication
to the dock increases
Change in savings due
to flex if duration
increases
1 1 -1 -1
2 3 1 1
3 3 1 1
4 1 -1 -1
5 2 1 1
6 3 1 1
7 3 1 2
8 1 1 -1
9 2 -1 -1
10 1 1 2
11 3 0 0
12 3 1 -1
13 3 1 1
14 3 -1 2
15 1 1 2
16 1 1 1
17 1 1 1
18 1 2 -1
19 1 0 0
20 1 0 0
21 1 1 1
II
Answer
 
Notes: Answers: 1:More Delay(Net Saving); 0:Same Strategy(Net Saving); -1:Less 
Delay(Net Saving); 2: no idea 
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APPENDIX I 
SUBJECT’S PERCEPTION OF THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN THE VALUE OF FLEXIBILITY AND ASSET VALUE. 
Interview Questions: 
a). If you played the Flexible Game again exactly as we just did EXCEPT that 
each operation cost $5,000 instead of $10,000, and the Flexibility Cost is half of what 
it was previously, would you delay your decision more often? Would net savings be 
[same, higher, lower]? How? Why? 
 
b). Suppose you are the project manager of a small construction company, will 
you use different flexibility policies on a between small project and a huge project. 
The failure of the huge project will lead to the bankrupt of your company 
Table I-1   Interview Answers D 
Particip
ant No.
Level of Risk-
Aversion
Change in
using of flex if
units costs and
exercise cost
are both lower
Change in
savings due to
flex if unit costs
and exercise
cost  are both
lower
Change in
using of flex if
units costs are
lower
Change in
savings due to
flex if unit costs
are lower
1 1 0 0 3 3
2 3 0 0 3 3
3 3 0 0 3 3
4 1 0 0 3 3
5 2 0 0 -1 -1
6 3 0 0 -1 -1
7 3 1 3 3 3
8 1 -1 -1 3 3
9 2 1 1 3 3
10 1 0 0 -1 -1
11 3 1 1 -1 -1
12 3 0 0 -1 -1
13 3 0 0 -1 -1
14 3 1 3 3 3
15 1 0 0 1 1
16 1 0 0 -1 -1
17 1 0 0 -1 -1
18 1 0 0 3 3
19 1 0 0 3 3
20 1 0 0 -1 -1
21 1 0 0 -1 -1
Answers
III a III b
 
Notes: Answers: 1:More Delay(Net Saving); 0:Same Strategy(Net Saving); -1:Less 
Delay(Net Saving); 2: no idea ; 3: not evaluated
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APPENDIX J  
SIMULATION MODEL 
The simulation model consists of three main subsystems: Installation Subsystem, 
Strategy Subsystem and Cost Subsystem, which is explained in following. Refer to 
the Model Structure section for part of model. Following is other part of the model. 
J.1 is the Rigid Game Policy switch and other extreme policies in the model. J.2 is 
the uncertainty model part. For details of model and equations refer to the Model 
included in the attached CD.  
 
J.1 Rigid Game Policy 
J.1.i Rigid Game Policy Switch 
Policies in the Rigid Game include: All-Guts Strategy; All-Test Strategy; Random 
Strategy; Rigid Game Best Choice Strategy (including Risk-averse – X Strategy) and 
Subjects’ Rigid Game Best Policy as discussed in Model Structure Section. Policy in 
Rigid Game decides “Test System Leaving Fabrication?” which decides the 
Installation Subsystem. 
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All-Guts Flag
All-Test Flag
Test System
Leaving
Fabrication?
Rigid Game
Strategy Switch Rigid Game Best
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Random Flag
<Random
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<Subject Rigid
Game Best Policy>
Subject's Rigid Game
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<Rigid Game Best
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Rigid Game
Policy Switch
Random
Strategy
Random
Decision
Random Seed
 
Figure J-1   Rigid Game Policy Switch 
 
Installation  
Subsystem 
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J.1.ii Rigid Game Best Choice Strategy 
Rigid Game Best Choice Strategy includes ‘Typical Rigid Game Strategy Flag’ (User 
can input his decision for each system to test the model reproduction.); Risk-averse – 
X Strategy as discussed in the Model Structure section, Project Site Condition 
Strategy, Sys. on Board Strategy and Project Site Strategy (all these strategies are 
based on conditions of the game board and make decision, which were explained in 
details in later of this Appendix.  
  
Rigid Game Best
Choice Strategy
<Risk Averse-X
Strategy>
<Typical Rigid
Game Strategy>
<Project Site
Condition Strategy>
<Sys. on Board
Strategy>
<Project Site
Strategy>
Rigid Game Best
Choice Strategy
Switch
Typical Rigid Game
Strategy Flag
Risk Avers-X
Strategy Flag
Project Site
Condition Strategy
Flag
Sys. on Board
Strategy Flag
Project Site
Strategy Flag
Rigid  Game Best
Choice Strategy
 
Figure J-2   Rigid Game Best Choice Strategy 
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Project Site Condition Strategy means test system until sum of Sys. Installed and 
Installable Sys. equals or is larger than the threshold. This strategy only consider the 
systems on site and sum of interface constraints met based on the project site, which 
does not consider other systems may stored on Tested Systems, System with Problem, 
Redesigned System, Rebuilt Systems stocks. 
 
Project Site  Condition Strategy
Sys. Installed or
Installable Sys.
<Project Site>
<Interface
Constraints Met
Flag>
Site Decision Threshold for
Sys. Installed or Installable
(Project Site Condition)
Project Site
Condition Strategy
<Time>
Second System
Leaving Fabrication
 
Figure J-3   Project Site Condition Strategy 
 
Sys. on Board Strategy means test systems until number of Sys. Leaving Dock equals 
or is larger than the site decision Threshold. This strategy only counts the nubmer of 
the systems that have left dock, which do not consider how many systems have met 
the interface constraint when making next decision for system leaving fabrication. 
Larger Z is, smaller Risk he/she takes. 
 
Sys. on Board Strategy
Site Decision
Threshold for System
on Board
Sys. on Board
Strategy
First System
Leaving Fabrication
<Time>
<Sys. on
Board>
 
Figure J-4   System on Board Strategy 
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Project Site Strategy means test system until number of Sys. Installed equals or is 
larger than the threshold. This strategy only counts the number of the systems that 
have been installed, which do not consider how many systems have met the interface 
constraint and systems maybe stored on board besides on Project site when making 
next decision. Larger A is, smaller Risk he/she takes. 
Project Site  Strategy
Site Decision Threshold
for System on Project
Site
<Project Site> Project Site
Strategy
<First System
Leaving
Fabrication>
 
Figure J-5   Project Site Strategy 
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J.4.iii Subject Rigid Game Best Policy 
As mentions in the Model Use section, Subjects’ Rigid Game Best Policy was 
modeled as:  
 If p(successful) > Site Decision Attractiveness Threshold 
 Then Decision for the next system leaving fabrication is ‘to Site’ 
 Else Decision for the next system leaving fabrication is ‘to Test’ 
Different Site Decision Attractiveness Threshold values were used for different levels 
of risk-aversion. 
Table J-1   Site Decision Attractiveness Threshold 
Risk-aversion Level Site Decision Attractiveness Threshold 
Risk-averse High [0.7, 0.8, 0.9] 
Risk-neutral Medium [0.4, 0.5, 0.6] 
Risk-seeking Low [0.1, 0.2, 0.3] 
 
If Flexible Game is played than Flexible Game Site Decision Threshold = 0.9 is 
active. Future research can use different threshold for different levels of 
Risk-aversion. 
Site Decision
Attractiveness
Threshold
Subject Rigid
Game Best Policy
Risk-averse Level Site
Decision Threshold in
Rigid Game
Risk-neutral Level Site
Decision Threshold in
Rigid Game
Risk-seeking level Site
Decision Threshold in
Rigid Game
<Risk-averse
Level Flag>
<Risk-neutral
Level Flag>
<Risk-seeking
Level Flag>
Flexible Game Site
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Figure J-6   Subject Rigid Game Best Policy 
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J.2. Uncertainty 
For Details refer to the Hypothesis Test section. First system leaving fabrication’s p(f) 
= 0, since it is guaranteed can be installed directly. Second system leaving 
fabrication’s p(f) is unknown, since no system is revealed. But the range is from 
11/15 (if the first system’s position is in the center of the project site) to 13/15 (if the 
first system’s position is on the corner of the project site). Last two systems leaving 
fabrication’s p(f) = 0, since they are guaranteed can be installed directly. p(f) = Sys. 
with constraints not met and not leaving Dock"/"Sys. not arrived Dock".  
 
p(Fail)
Sys. not arrived
Dock
<Time>
Sys. with constraints not
met and not leaving
Dock
<Interface
Constraints Met
Flag>
<Systems in
Fabrication>
p(successful)
Uncertainty
p(fail) for First Sys.
Leaving Fab.
p(fail) for Second
Sys. Leaving Fab.
p(fail) for Last Two
Sys. Leaving Fab.
<System in
Transit>
<System at
Dock>
Uncertainty
 
Figure J-17   Uncertainty 
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APPENDIX K 
MODEL PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS  
OF EXTREME RIGID GAME POLICIES 
Table K-1   Performance of Extreme Rigid Game 
Strategy Min. Max. Range by Analysis
All-Guts 160 550 390
All-Tests 320 320 0
Random 160 550 390
Risk-Averse 230 290 60  
  Unit: $1,000 
 
All-Guts Strategy:  
Minimum Cost: $160,000 = 16 * $10,000 
All systems were successfully installed, when the sequence of systems arriving at the 
dock were each adjacent to a previously installed system on the project site. Each of 
the 16 systems only cost $10,000. 
Example:   
System Transport Order Seed: 137 
System Sequence: 15, 11, 10, 6, 9, 14, 7, 2, 8, 13, 5, 16, 4, 1, 3, 12 
All systems can be successfully installed without testing.  
 
Maximum Cost: $54,000 = 3 * $10,000 + 13 * $40,000 
If the sequence of systems arriving at the dock was not adjacent to a previous 
installed system, then a maximum of 13 systems would fail. Then, three systems 
successfully installed at a cost of $10,000 each, 13 systems failed and each costs 
$40,000.  
 
Example:   
System Transport Order Seed: 173 
System Sequence: 1, 8, 9, 16, 13, 12, 7, 14, 3, 10, 4, 15, 6, 11, 2, 5 
Only 1, 2, 5 can be successfully installed without testing, the others are failed to install.  
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All-Tests Strategy 
All systems are tested. Each system cost $20,000 no matter what the sequence was.  
Cost: $10,000*16*2=$ 320,000.  
 
Random Strategy 
Minimum cost and Maximum cost Random Strategy is same as All-Guts Strategy.  
Minimum Cost: $160,000 = 16 * $10,000 
All decisions are ‘to Site’ and all systems were successfully installed, when the 
sequence of systems arriving at the dock were each adjacent to a previous installed 
system on the project site. Each of the 16 systems only cost $10,000. 
 
Maximum Cost: $54,000 = 3 * $10,000 + 13 * $40,000 
All decisions are ‘to Site’ but the sequence of system is not good. If the sequence of 
systems arriving at the dock was not adjacent to a previous installed system, then a 
maximum 13 systems would fail. Then, three systems successfully installed at a cost 
of $10,000 each, 13 systems failed and each costs $40,000.  
 
Risk-averse Strategy 
Minimum Cost: $230,000 = 9 * $10,000 + 7 * $20,000 
If the sequence of the first couple of systems installed are adjacent to each other, than 
only 7 systems need to be tested before the other systems are guaranteed to be 
installed successfully without testing.  
Example:  
System Transport Order Seed = 84 
System Sequence: 7, 10, 2, 9, 3, 12, 11, 13, 4, 5, 15, 8, 1, 6, 16 
Only systems 10, 2, 9, 3, 12, 11, 13 need to be tested, other systems are guaranteed to be 
installed without testing.  
 
Maximum Cost: $290,000 = 3 * $10,000 + 13 * $20,000 
If the sequence of the first couple of systems is not of systems adjacent to each other, 
then up to 13 systems need to be tested before the other systems are guaranteed to be 
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installed. 
Example:  
System Transport Order Seed = 173 
System Sequence: 1, 8, 9, 16, 13, 12, 7, 14, 3, 10, 4, 15, 6, 11, 2, 5 
Only systems 1, 2, 5 are guaranteed not to fail installation, others are shipped to the yard 
to be tested before installation.  
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APPENDIX L 
SIMULATED RISK-AVERSE – X STRATEGY PERFORMANCE 
IN RIGID GAME 
Table L-1   Simulated Risk-averse – X Strategy Performance in Rigid Game 
X Mean Median Std.Dev.
Skewne
ss
25%
Confidence
Band
75%
Confidence
Band
Simulated
Min.
Simulated
Max.
Simlated
Range
0 268 270 12.0 -0.35 260 280 230 290 60
1 259 260 14.1 0.12 250 270 220 310 90
2 255 255 17.9 0.72 240 260 220 330 110
3 253 250 22.1 0.97 240 260 210 350 140
4 254 250 27.0 1.24 240 270 200 370 170
5 257 250 32.3 1.10 230 280 200 390 190
6 260 255 37.3 1.10 230 280 190 410 220
7 267 260 42.2 0.98 240 290 190 430 240
8 273 270 46.8 0.88 240 300 180 450 270
9 282 280 51.7 0.77 250 310 180 470 290
10 291 280 55.4 0.66 250 330 180 490 310
11 303 300 58.5 0.63 270 330 180 510 330
12 313 320 61.8 0.57 275 350 170 530 360
13 326 310 64.8 0.56 280 370 160 550 390  
Unit: $1,000 
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